Government is an Unlikely Agent of Change for Postcommunist Civil Society

After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism, many observers had high expectations for the future of postcommunist societies. Free from the restraints of totalitarianism, it was expected that the populations of these states would take advantage of their newfound ability to participate in government and voluntary civil society organizations. The reality of the postcommunist experience, however, has been quite different. Civil society in postcommunist states has been relatively weak, as measured by participation in voluntary organizations. In his article, The Weakness of Postcommunist Civil Society, Marc Morje Howards seeks to uncover an explanation for this deficit as well as recommendations for change in the future. While the article in general is valuable, Howard, in discussing the role of the state as an agent of change, presents a policy prescription for the future that is inconsistent with the explanations that he provides.

Howard discusses the legacy of the communist experience as one of the primary causes of the current civil society deficit in many postcommunist countries. Under communism, participation in civil organizations was neither independent of the state nor voluntary. Rather, citizens were obliged to join certain state-run civil and social organizations, largely so that the state could monitor and channel the activities of its citizens. For the most part, citizens disliked such forced participation in social organizations. Thus, they were more likely to form small social networks consisting of close friends and family. This legacy of the communist system has persisted into the postcommunist era, resulting in a deficit of civil society organizations. Citizens have embraced freedom as granting them the right to not participate in civil society, rather than the other way around.

Howard asserts that the civil society deficit can in part be corrected by an active role for the state in ‘facilitating the existence and flourishing of civil society organizations.’ This seems to be at odds, however, with the very cause of the civil society deficit, and would probably be more counterproductive than helpful. Under communism, the only civil society organizations were run by the state, and very unpopular. Given the persistence of the communist legacy, most citizens of postcommunist states would probably be wary of any attempts by their governments to create and encourage civil society organizations. They would be likely to equate these with the organizations that existed ender the communist state, and thus unlikely to participate.

If this is indeed the case, it seems to indicate that the outlook for postcommunist civil society is bleak, at least in the short term. As long as the majority of citizens, especially those in positions of power, have an outlook colored by the communist experience, civil society participation is likely to be low. Therefore, change is most likely to come as the result of generational change and the resultant shifts in attitude towards civil society participation.