The Chinese Exception

China is perhaps the clearest counterexample to the Lipset hypothesis on the causal relationship between economic development and democracy. China's economy has been rapidly developing for years and very few advancements towards democracy have occurred. Instead, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is arguably more in favor now than before economic reforms occurred, in large part due to the success of the reforms as the CCP has able to gain legitimacy in the eyes of its citzens' by claiming credit for the economic development.

As Mary Gallagher notes in “Reform and Openness,” many ex-Communist states have faced political instability which lead to the collapse of socialism because they “failed to keep up their end of the social contract” (Gallagher 1). In contrast, China's slow and successful implementation of economic reforms has acquiesced any major political concerns its population may have as “many Chinese people crave stability and economic progress more than they long for a voice in politics” (Meredith 155).

Although both Gallagher and Meredith offer some sliver of hope in regards to the future Chinese democracy, I would argue that economic development has in many ways solidified the CCP's standing among its citizens, and there is no imminent demand for democracy or democratic political reforms. Gallagher argues that democracy has been delayed but that the integration of China's legal system to global standards will eventually stimulate political change (Gallagher 17). Similarly, Meredith contends that “the political atmosphere has improved” because some abuses have been “declared illegal—in word” and there has been an increased number of protests (Meredith 152-153).

While these offer hope for increased rule of law in China, they do not point to the path of democracy. First off, China has a weak civil society characteristic of most post-Communist countries especially among the urban poor and rural populations. Moreover, the Chinese governments intense fear of political instability has led them to constantly make economic accomodations to possible voices of dissent. For example, the recent economic stimulus package and land reforms clearly target the rural protests over property and the urban poor threatened by the United States' (and as a result, China's) economic slowdown. Although property rights are a feasible future development in China's political climate, democracy is not. There is an entrenched cultural ideology of authoritarian norms due to China's history as always being under some kind of authoritarian state, and without the catalyst of a severe economic downturn, the CCP will maintain its legitimacy and stronghold over the Chinese state.