The Financial Crisis and its effects on politics in the Developing World

In class, we discussed how developing countries face an added dimension of difficulty in deciding and implementing policies due to the strong presence of international actors and organizations in their countries. In recent times, many of these countries have often argued that the policy recommendations (or in some cases, policy restrictions) made by international organizations tend to be unsuitable for developing countries, as the policies tend to come from the power players of the international community: the Western industrialized nations. The argument is, not only are the political and economic ideologies of the developed and the developing world vary from state to state, moreover, their economic concerns and goals are vastly divergent. More often than not, developing countries feel that they are getting the short end of the stick, for by complying with the policies of international organizations they end up only helping the growth of already developed countries instead of being able to focus on their own struggles.

However, I believe the traditional imbalance of power between developed and developing countries in policy making in the international community is starting to change with the now-global financial crisis. The best example of this is the recent G20 meeting on the financial crisis. The G20 comprises about 90% of the global GDP, and is much more of a truly international economic body than the G7 or G8 and includes many developing countries that also have rapidly expanding economies. This inclusion of those outside the usual clique of developed industrialized nations in developing international policy that the G8 leaders are aware of how much assistance they are going to need from developing countries to get out of this current economic crisis. Not only are developing countries getting a seat at the table for a critical international issue, they also currently hold significant power in developing policy as they are the countries whose banks are in the best health.

This shift of power, while subtle now, will only get more visible as time goes on. For to resolve the financial crisis, there needs to be cooperation and assistance from many developing countries and international policy can no longer be solely determined by the developed world as they are the ones trapped in crisis. The policy of international organizations and the international community can finally be international, instead of being an extra political limb for the Western world.

A Reflection on Last Week's Articles

Although written in two different times about slightly different subjects, The Elephant and the Dragon and "What Can Beijing Learn From Moscow" have some overlapping points. Both authors are concerned with the instability as the result of dissenters. Meredith says that the gap between rural and urban Chinese causes a rise in demonstrations and instability. Buruma focuses more on the danger of such a large mass of people taking control in a violent revolt. Such revolts have been part of Chinese history and there is that underlying fear. Both authors agree that the economic transition has changed the class system in China, although Buruma says the new middle class has not led to civil society.

Meredith addresses the corruption and its relation to economic development in a section of the book on India. During the 1970s and 1980s, when bizarre and restraining economic laws had been put into place, corruption was widespread since many of the laws required a license to be obtained and one usually needed to use bribery or other corrupt methods. Buruma suggests that corruption is endemic and perhaps inevitable in any transition to democracy, given the new opportunities for making money and taking advantage of people. Buruma also notes that Russians claim their brand of democracy is less destructive because it is out in the open and discussed, while presumably the Chinese keep it hidden.

Both authors agree that transitions to capitalism have a number of possible issues with the population. However, neither seems to suggest that the problems of corruption will be endless and problematic for the future of the system. The issue of dissent, though, is the big unknown and the possible serious problem. Imagine if all the rural Chinese revolted. There could be huge implications for the global market as well as domestic security.

Variation in Ethnic Violence

In “Ethnic and Nationalist Violence”, Rogers Brubaker and David Laitin highlight that the fundamental problem in the literature concerning ethnic violence does not have to do with competing theories about a well-defined phenomenon; rather, the overarching argument has to do with what exactly constitutes ethnic violence. Can ethnic violence be distinctly classified as one particular phenomenon and if so, when is the disconnect between ethnic and political violence bridged? In other words, when do these two phenomena become one and the same?

First of all, while pointing out that ethnic violence is certainly not ubiquitous, Brubaker and Laitin do emphasize the recent increase in its occurrence in regions of the former Soviet Union and Sub-Saharan Africa. The first explanation concerns the decline or “decay of the Weberian state”, an argument which utilizes Max Weber’s definition of the state as an entity that has a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within a territory, or a defined piece of real estate. Brubaker and Laitin point out that inability of states in the developing world to maintain order as a result of diminishing transnational, state-strengthening resources. The lack of an “external patron” to help maintain peace in the region makes ethnic cleavages more likely to translate into conflict, and ultimately, erupt into violence.

What Brubaker and Laitin fail to point out in this discussion, however, is the analogous ability of transnational resources to function as means for furthering ethnic violence. For example, in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, I would argue that the availability of economic and military resources to the Yakouba ethnic group in Cote d’Ivoire from their kin across the Liberian border largely influenced their choice of armed violence rather than non-violent protest against the government in 2002. The availability of transnational resources can therefore play a role in the method of protest—violent or non-violent—that an ethnic group may choose.
Brubaker and Laitin’s second explanation concerns the ideological shifts that have occurred since the fall of Communism. The authors point to ethnic separatist movements between the 1950s and 1980s that framed the struggle between the opposition and the incumbent in the context of the larger struggle between communism and capitalism. Today, as many NGOs and international institutions are beginning to recognize individual ethnic group claims, the incentive of violent challengers to structure their struggle in the context of human rights and ethnic claims has strengthened. In fact, this “ethnicization” of violence is perhaps the underlying reason behind Brubaker and Laitin’s claim that interpretations of violent struggles as exemplars of ethnic violence are subject to so much dispute.

When examining violence within the framework of ethnic conflict, Brubaker and Laitin point out the importance of looking at violence not as a degree but rather, as a phase of conflict. The authors, therefore, establish the definition of ethnic violence to as “violence perpetrated across ethnic lines, in which at least one party is not a state, and in which the ethnic difference is noted…as having been integral rather than incidental to the violence.” They then provide an analytical review of the literature on ethnic violence, examining three particular approaches to ethnic violence: inductive or data-driven, theory-driven (deriving from realism, game theory and rational choice theory) and culturalist. Within the inductive approach, what I found most interesting was Laitin and Brubaker’s discussion of the variation between regions with similar ethnic tensions in which one has erupted into ethnic violence while ethnic conflict in the other region has been largely nonviolent. Many questions arise when examining this variation, as in the case between the Basques and the Catalan. Why is it that ethnic conflict has been characterized by the violence of the terrorist ETA while the conflict in Catalonia has been relatively non-violent? If Laitin and Brubaker define violence as a phase in ethnic conflict, is it only a matter of time before ethnic conflict will erupt into violence in the autonomous region of Catalonia? In analyzing these questions, I found it especially helpful to look at Brubaker and Laitin’s “cultural construction of fear” within their cultural approaches. Indeed, the legacy of Francisco Franco’s repression and attempted elimination of Basque and Catalan language and culture in attempt to establish a unified, centralist Spanish identity still continues today. However, it seems that while the main concern in Catalonia has been the perpetuation of its language and culture, the Basque language, spoken and understood by less than one-fourth of the ethnic group, has been more a source of division than anything else. Therefore, Basque nationalism is still largely based on the fear of centralist repression (from the Spanish state) rather than on its common cultural or linguistic identity.

As I attempted to analyze and digest Brubaker and Laitin’s three approaches towards ethnic conflict, the existing variation and heterogeneity between occurrences of ethnic violence became a dominant theme. Brubaker and Laitin’s discussion of the need to identify, analyze and explain the differences between instances of ethnic violence is a extremely valuable, for, rather than attempting to construct one enormous and dilute theory of ethnic violence, we are better off analyzing the variations first and foremost. After all, that is what comparative politics is all about.

Iran, an Exception to Modernization

Joel Migdal's analysis on the state provides some interesting insights into Iranian history. He notes that the first acts of modern European states were to create a standing army, an efficient tax collecting system, and an expanded set of judicial courts in order to consolidate control. They were the keys to greater societal mobilization that could bring greater international clout. Reza Shah and Muhammad Reza Shah sought to institute similar reforms, modernizing the military, revising the tax system, and westernizing the courts. Certainly, these aims were quite successful. Throughout the years leading up to the Islamic Revolution and during the revolution itself, the army always maintained loyalty to the Shah.

Military control, however, is different than social control. Although Muhammad Reza Shah had an army that unquestionably supported him, he never quite understood what Iranians wanted. The shah spoke of the bazaars, a traditionally important merchant group in Iran, in a way that seemed to ignore Iranian history. He described them as "a fanatical lot, highly resistant to change." Indeed, he even said that "their time is past". And therefore, regardless of what the bazaars wanted, he would persist on his path to modernity. The Iranians, in contrast to the example of India, Egypt, and Israel of the same time period, did not want to follow along. The determination of the Shah to modernize managed to create a reactionary tendency in many Iranians to avoid modernity, with some, in complete opposition to the Shah's reasoning, saw a return to strict Islamic principles as the only way Iran could actually flourish. For a leader to be truly powerful influential, this canyon between the Shah and Iranians demonstrates, he/she must maintain some favor in the eyes of at least some of his/her population

Iran provides some lessons to other states, particularly those in the Middle East. Forced mobilization is different social mobilization. One country in particular is walking a fine line. Egypt, which is seeing a growth of Islamic civil society, has a constitution which claims that any legislation must be in accordance with Islam. On the other hand, political parties with a religious agenda are banned. If Egypt does not accept the tendencies of its population, it might soon spark a reactionary attitude, similar to that of the Islamic Republic.

Islamic Movements vs. Democracy

In her article, "Three Kinds of Movements," Tamara Cofman Wittes discusses the prominence of Islamist movements and the prospects for democratic change in the Arab world where these movements have been present. Wittes asserts that the term "Islamist" is so vague as to render the term meaningless. It is because of this vagueness that she categorizes Islamic movements into three types. Despite the varying characteristics and consequently different policy approaches for each type, the barrier to moving towards democracy may be too great to overcome because of the definition of "Islamist." Put simply, "Islamist" refers to a political view that is based on religious interpretations and obligations. As long as Islamist movements are prominent in the Arab world, democracy will most likely not be recognized and is perhaps not a fundamental goal or intended end.

Political Islam is carried out by the groups that make up the three characteristically different Islamic movements. The relationship between politics and religion favors religion in such a way that politics are dependent on religious views. Many of the Islamic values that dictate the politics of Islamist movements contradict democratic principles that are necessary to build and sustain democracy. If state and religion are no separate, Islamic values will trump democratic ones, especially when the use of force is monopolized by a particular group or various groups in a weak or failing state. However, even a "moderate" Islamic movement in a strong state in which groups want to "transform society and government into something more 'Islamic,'" the religious focus of bringing about change is not sufficient to bring about democratic change and would require a transformed political perspective. 

Though I am skeptical about democratic change as a result of Islamic movements, I am not sure that these movements are striving for such change in the first place. If groups are fundamentally Islamist, is the purpose of moderation necessarily to step towards real democracy? Even if public discussion of political issues is expanded, such discussion may remain religiously-oriented since that is the very nature of Islamist movements. And even if restrictions on political association and the formation of political parties are eased, those political associations and political parties may simply be extensions of Islamist movements. The means of Islamist movements are not exactly compatible with a democratic end, again because of the religious influence on politics.

I am not saying that one cannot both be Muslim and desire democratic change, since there is a substantial Muslim population in the United States, but a political movement that is based on Islam poses many challenges to the process of democracy. If an Islamic movement were to exist and function within a democracy, what would be the relation between the authority of the caliph and the power of the fairly and freely elected political leader? In a court of law, what would be the relation between the decision of the imam and the ruling of the court? In regards to Islamic law, imams may give different interpretations and therefore different "rulings" about divorce and the consequent agreements over money and children. According to my current Islam class, if a Muslim is dissatisfied with a "ruling," he or she may choose to seek the decision of another imam. This inconsistency is a product of various Islamic interpretations, and raises an important question about the coherence of Islamic and democratic values. 

Give Them a Break

In Strong Societies and Weak States, Migdal points out the incredibly high expectations held by Westerners of newly independent Third World states and the manifestations of these expectations in the newly developed international institutions and norms that emphasized Human Rights, social and economic justice and development. The manifestations of these high expectations and the high expectations themselves, although good-hearted in nature, actually undermined the new states ability to develop into strong states because they placed too much pressure on and demanded too much of newly independent states. Not only did newly independent states have to develop a legitimate, central government that could perform the basic required tasks, but at the same time, they also had to immediately grant civil and political liberties and economic and social justice to its citizens. In order to meet these expectations, states had to do more than they were capable of, which only led to failure and further weakening for most states. This was the case for many African countries that tried to maintain multiparty democracy after independence, but failed to do so because they lacked the capacity needed and as a result, transitioned quickly to authoritarian or Afro-Marxist regimes. Clearly, these demands by the West and Western institutions were asking too much of new states and they were not taking into consideration the actual conditions and capabilities of the states, which didn’t allow for such rapid development. The Western states also did not take into consideration the length of time it took for them to develop the political and civil liberties its citizens presently enjoyed. These high expectations and high levels of pressure continue today, Migdal says himself that, “the international environment demands more of states, especially those facing impoverished populations, than ever before.” (17)

In my opinion, even though I know or at least I assume Western states and institutions have the best intentions, it was and still is unfair for them to demand so much of developing nations because while they (Western states) were developing, they never had to wrestle with outside states or institutions instructing them on how they should run their governments, economies and societies, rather they were left to their own devices and allowed to develop at their own pace. Of course, the global environment was different during the development of Western states and I am not arguing that Western states and institutions stop providing aid. What I am arguing for is a new way to approach the distribution of aid, a way that empowers states instead of humiliating and weakening them. Perhaps, we need to return to the idea of the developmental state and channel monetary aid through the governments and in doing so give power back to the leaders of states. Of course, this is challenging, since many developing states are weak and therefore their governments are poor instruments for development purposed. However, the purpose of developmental aid is to strengthen governments and maybe, in order to strengthen governments we need to give them greater responsibility.

The Future of Islam

It is interesting to note the three distinctions of Islam that Tamara Cofman points out in her piece “Three Kinds of Movements”. Cofman seems to make the argument that in general people practicing Islam can be categorized based on their use of violence and the state in which they operate in. I think it is interesting to think about how the separation of church and state would work with the Islam faith.

Unfortunately, I think the fact that Islam is the foundation for governing will prevent an adequate and satisfactory democracy from being achieved. I feel that one interprets their faith in many different ways. A prime example of this is the September 11 attacks. Some scholars make the point that Osama Bin Laden interpreted the Koran in a way that seemed to encourage such violence like what occurred. Others say that Bin Laden isn’t a true Muslim.

I think the point here is that it would be tough for a group of people in a state to come to a consensus on exactly how the Koran says to rule a state. I think this is why a majority of Islamic ruled regimes are ruled by a select few, i.e. Saudi Arabia. In my opinion, these differing interpretations are what lead to radical movements and groups like Hamas forming. The people who form these groups are so fed up with someone else’s interpretation of their faith that they decide to forcefully practice their own way. In this way, they not only separate themselves from the state’s sovereignty but furthermore create a gateway for others to rebel as well.

In my opinion, I think Islamist groups can evolve into global democratic leaders across the world. However, I think these groups will only work if they disassociate themselves from the state and its connection to the Koran. In order to do so, I think the best way would be to establish a nonviolent agenda that circumnavigates the general philosophy of Islam.

Does Ethnic Diversity cause Political Violence?

In the article, “Ethnicity and Development in Africa: A Reappraisal”, Bates says that Ethnic Diversity is not a significant reason or cause for political violence. Although Bates tries to form strong evidence on why he believes this is true, he fails to convince the reader that this is really a strong hypothesis. I think it is important to define Ethnic Diversity, before arguing what it does or doesn’t do. Bates fails do this, but touches upon what makes up human capital. In my opinion, his description of the structure of families in Africa is only part of what an ethnic group is. These ethnic groups are formed from many of these familial generations that he speaks about. They extend throughout society and as time goes on they are bound to achieve different ethos and standards of political satisfaction. Bates fails to account for the human aspect of these ethnic groups but rather takes a mathematical approach which in my opinion does not bolster his thesis.

Rather than presenting a mathematical model to provide evidence on why his thesis is correct, he confuses his reader and in my opinion proves the antithesis. He says that when an ethnic group represents the hegemony then the chance of violence is greater. In the case of Africa, most of the ruling parties are seen as the hegemonic power, though they might not be the full majority, they are most probably viewed as the hegemony to the other ethnic groups. According to Bates, if the other ethnic groups feel a hegemonic power they are more prone to political violence. Bates says that this is usually possible when the ethnic group represent 50 percent or more of population. I would suggest that a majority of ruling parties in Africa are seen as the hegemonic power and are therefore ruling, but do not represent more than 50 percent of the population.

The Chinese Exception

China is perhaps the clearest counterexample to the Lipset hypothesis on the causal relationship between economic development and democracy. China's economy has been rapidly developing for years and very few advancements towards democracy have occurred. Instead, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is arguably more in favor now than before economic reforms occurred, in large part due to the success of the reforms as the CCP has able to gain legitimacy in the eyes of its citzens' by claiming credit for the economic development.

As Mary Gallagher notes in “Reform and Openness,” many ex-Communist states have faced political instability which lead to the collapse of socialism because they “failed to keep up their end of the social contract” (Gallagher 1). In contrast, China's slow and successful implementation of economic reforms has acquiesced any major political concerns its population may have as “many Chinese people crave stability and economic progress more than they long for a voice in politics” (Meredith 155).

Although both Gallagher and Meredith offer some sliver of hope in regards to the future Chinese democracy, I would argue that economic development has in many ways solidified the CCP's standing among its citizens, and there is no imminent demand for democracy or democratic political reforms. Gallagher argues that democracy has been delayed but that the integration of China's legal system to global standards will eventually stimulate political change (Gallagher 17). Similarly, Meredith contends that “the political atmosphere has improved” because some abuses have been “declared illegal—in word” and there has been an increased number of protests (Meredith 152-153).

While these offer hope for increased rule of law in China, they do not point to the path of democracy. First off, China has a weak civil society characteristic of most post-Communist countries especially among the urban poor and rural populations. Moreover, the Chinese governments intense fear of political instability has led them to constantly make economic accomodations to possible voices of dissent. For example, the recent economic stimulus package and land reforms clearly target the rural protests over property and the urban poor threatened by the United States' (and as a result, China's) economic slowdown. Although property rights are a feasible future development in China's political climate, democracy is not. There is an entrenched cultural ideology of authoritarian norms due to China's history as always being under some kind of authoritarian state, and without the catalyst of a severe economic downturn, the CCP will maintain its legitimacy and stronghold over the Chinese state.

Is democratization really an issue in contemporary China?

Mary Elizabeth Gallagher in her “Reform and Openness” article claims to take a different direction than the influential Lipset article that claims a causal relationship between economic growth and a movement towards democratization. In “Reform and Openness,” Gallagher focuses on the early implementations and inflows of FDI and how it allowed the authoritarian regime to stay, with relative stability, in mainland China. Unlike her colleagues, who focus more narrowly on the effects of FDI, Gallagher chooses to concentrate on why FDI prevented the PRC from losing its legitimacy in the eyes of the Chinese people.

Although Gallagher’s views may seem different from others in the field, it still essentially accepts the Lipset theory as a stated fact. The entire article suggests that China is the unique exception to Lipset’s theory and frames itself in a way to prove why Lipset does not apply to the Chinese case. Though China remains a Leninist state among a sea of collapsed socialist states, Gallagher’s article suggests that China will eventually follow the path to democratization. This view is clear in the title of the article’s last section, “Delayed Democracy”.

Gallagher’s article does not acknowledge the possibility that the Chinese people may not necessarily care to democratize at all, at least during the current times. Her attention to FDI, while raising several good points about why China’s shift to an open market economy was smooth, seems to ignore or not factor in some human realities of China’s history and mentality during the twentieth century. Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution did not just cause a “dire capital shortage”; millions starved as a result of these policies. Perhaps China’s smooth transition can also be attributed to competition between firms, but the simple realization of the Chinese people that they have more to eat as a result of the “Reform and Openness” policy could have very well led to their ignoring of now seemingly lesser important governmental actions. This point is made clear in the Tiananmen Square case: though it stands stark in the minds of the older generation of political dissidents, a new generation of young Chinese, now able to spend, eat, and play as they please, do not know nor case about this event that happened a mere twenty years ago. This dismissal can not only be attributed to governmental censorship.

A "Virtual President" for a "Virtual Democracy"

Pierre Hassner provides an insightful commentary on Russia's current domestic and foreign politics, and perhaps even more intriguing, describes the probable domestic and foreign policies Russia could adopt in the future to meet its end goals.  In doing so, Hassner makes an ingenious distinction between Vladimir Putin's "virtual democracy"--an image created to cater to the democracy-loving 'West'--and the true governmental structure that lies beneath this democracy facade.  Hassner asserts that in reality, Putin has placed Russia on a course away from democracy and towards autocracy.  In the article "Russia's transition to Autocracy" Hassner states that Putin's "predominant strategy sought to maintain the appearance of democarcy while progressively emptying democratic institutions of their content," and that "key aspects of the new dispensation are strong reminiscent of fascism".   Citing a "rise in xenophobia to a level comparable to that found among Germans in the years preceding Nazism, and the growing public admiration for Stalin," Hassner lays the foundation for his critique of Russia's move towards autocracy.  He comments that "Putin helps to inspire a 'fortress' mentality in Russia, and gives himself a pretext for branding any domestic opposition as treason and for calling upon everyone to rally behind the leader".  This power has enabled Putin to convince the people of Russia that the West is working together in "a great conspiracy against Russia".  With a renewed sense of nationalism, Russians have placed their support behind this strong leader and a government which at a quick glance resembles a democracy, but on second look, is covered in signs of fascism.  While many Russian liberals defend the legitimacy of its democracy, it is impossible to deny that under Putin, there has been a "hardening against the domestic opposition, the freedom of the press, and any democratic life inside Russia" and that there is a "growing hostility towards Russia's neighbors" to say the least.    

While his critique and predictions are very interesting, I found one statement to stand out above all of the rest, and is thus, what I will examine in more depth and analyze in the context of recent events and speeches.  In this article, Hassner explains that Putin has "chosen to designate a virtual president for a virtual democracy, while keeping real power himself".  After reading this piece, I am left wondering the extent to which Dmitri Medvedev is a puppet of Putin designated to bolster Russia's image as a democracy.  Right before being named as Putin's hand-picked successor, Medvedev gave a speech in which he contended that "Russia is a country of legal nihilism at a level...that no European country can boast of" and that "Corruption in the official structures has a huge scale and the fight against it should become a national program"1.  In the same speech, Medvedev said "We should continue to openly and clearly explain our actions and plans in the economic, social sphere and politics, and find more allies in the world....Russia in the future will continue developing as a nation open for dialogue and cooperation with the international community"2.  In recent months, Medvedev has been a strong proponent of opening talks with the European Union, citing similarities in values and national goals as a foundation for a hopeful strong future relationship.  Along with Medvedev's constant rhetoric centered on the fight against corruption and promotion of justice, I have found the appointment of the new Minister of Justice as yet another sign of the bolstering of Russia's "virtual democracy".  The new minister is known as a proponent of democracy, and many have determine that the extent of power he holds and will hold over the course of Medvedev's presidency is a solid indicator of the actual change in the fight against corruption and the defending of democracy.  

The interesting challenge is determining the equilibrium of power in Russia--a task which involves comparing Russia's recent actions in Georgia with Medvedev's democratic supportive rhetoric and desire for a strong partnership with the European Union, while always being weary of Putin's overarching power.  While Hassner asserts that Russia is on a course towards autocracy, it is nevertheless interesting to watch the evolution of Medvedev's influence and power.  Will Medvedev eclipse Putin?  Will Medvedev remain loyal and act as Putin's puppet?  Will Putin return to the presidency in a final move to consolidate power?  These are only a few questions, and the answer to each question brings forth an entire different direction for Russia--a movement towards the Russia of old or perhaps even more frightening, towards a new undefined and unknown Russia.

1 and 2. www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/01/22/europe/EU-POL-Russia-Medvedev.php

China, India, and Development Strategy

In The Elephant and the Dragon, Robyn Meredith discusses the rapid rises of China and India as global economic powerhouses. Given the state of these two nations only a generation ago, these rises seem even more spectacular and improbable. China was an oppressive totalitarian communist state, in which economic prosperity was unheard of and extreme poverty the norm. India, though democratic, was similarly undeveloped due to its protectionist regime and stifling anti-business laws. As these states have liberalized their economies, however, they have experienced unprecedented levels of sustained economic growth.

As Meredith’s book is not particularly academic, she does not draw any general theoretical conclusions about development from the Chinese and Indian cases. These can be inferred, however, by comparing and contrasting the Indian and Chinese approaches to development. Some theoretical conclusions about development strategy can be made and applied to other cases in the developing world. First, both countries have been successful in attracting high levels of foreign direct investment. As these states broke down the barriers, either protectionist or socialist, that prevented the inflow of FDI, they experienced massive influxes of foreign capital. This investment has been crucial for the development of industrial capabilities. Secondly, both countries have made significant investments in domestic infrastructure, although India currently lags far behind China with respect to infrastructure development. China’s superior infrastructure has given it an advantage in attracting export-oriented industries that require the transformation of massive amounts of goods. India has been less successful in developing industry because of its poor infrastructure. Thus, infrastructure development is a crucial component of any development strategy. Finally, some aspects of India and China’s development strategies can be linked to their contrasting political systems. India, as a democracy, has implemented reforms in a piecemeal fashion, with progress being contingent on the political environment. China, on the other hand, has been able to implement a continuous series of reforms through its rule by fiat. It could thus be argued that authoritarian rule is actually conducive to the implementation of a coherent development strategy.

Drawing from the cases of China and India, it can be concluded that attracting foreign direct investment and modernizing infrastructure are crucial components of a development strategy. A more controversial conclusion would be that it is easier to achieve development under the leadership of an authoritarian states. Outside of the realm of economic development, however, authoritarianism has more nefarious consequences that must be considered. These have not yet emerged in China, but many expect that they eventually will and could bring the entire development project to a halt.

How FDIs Have Served as a Key Factor in Delaying Democracy in China

In "'Reform and Openness': Why China's Economic Reforms Have Delayed Democracy," Mary Gallagher ventures to explain how China has managed to balance rapid economic growth and great social change while continuing to maintain political authoritarianism. Whereas East Asia has shifted toward democratization as a result of the accelerated pace of economic growth it experienced during the 1970s and 1980s, China has been able to maintain a vigorous economy for over twenty years without falling to political liberalization and turning only slightly toward democratic government. China's ability to resist democratization stands in direct contrast to historical examples and literature connecting economic development to democracy. Explaining this exception, Gallagher attributes China's abnormality to "the timing and sequencing of its foreign direct investment (FDI) liberalization." 

In analyzing the effects of FDI liberalization in the political realm, Gallagher gives a three-part argument as to why political liberalization has not come about. Firstly, the success that China experienced with its FDI liberalization allowed to Chinese state to execute destabilizing reforms. This served to fragment the parts of society, particularly the urban class, that would be the ones to lose the most from economic reform. Secondly, there was increased competition between regions and firms and within firms to draw in the FDI. Lastly, this pouring in of capital into China's economy led to debates about national industry versus foreign competition and public versus private ownership. In each of these arguments, the fragmentation of society has led to a stronger Chinese state and a weakened civil society; therefore, reforms in the privatization of the state sector and the developing of an indigenous capitalist class followed the liberalization of FDI. China was successful, as opposed to Russia and Eastern Europe and Korea and Taiwan, in the maintenance of its political authority because of this sequencing. While China took the route of FDI liberalization Russia and Eastern Europe chose to privatize industry and quickly reform institution of socialism, resulting in its, and Taiwan and Korea chose to keep their domestic economies closed by limiting FDI resulting in a weaker business

class and a slower economy.  

The Effects of Weak Civil Society on EU development

In "The Weakness of Post-Communist Civil Society,” Howard contends that the civil society in Post-Communist countries is distinctively weaker due to “the legacy of mistrust of communist organizations” and “post-communist disappointment” among other reasons. While Howard abstains from declaring that the low level of participation in civil society means that post-communist democracy development is doomed, I think the weakness of Post-Communist civil society has more important implications if viewed within the context of EU development.

The EU is currently grappling with developing a distinct political identity and is significantly hindered by the low turnout in EU elections and the democracy deficit. However, if this deficit is demolished with a reform of the EU power distribution, it threatens to even more divide the EU between the “Kern Europa”—the core of the EU, and historical leaders of Western Europe: France, Germany, and England—and the other smaller EU members, many of which were formally a part of the USSR. Following Howard’s data on Post-Communist civil society, even if all EU citizens are given a greater role in determining those in power in the EU, those citizens in Post-Communist countries are significantly more likely to not participate in elections because of their legacy of mistrust of organizations and post-communist disappointment in the economic and political development of the new system.

As a result, the fragmentation of the EU political identity will increase as Post-Communist countries struggle to develop civic participation and a typical European democracy. Despite how economically integrated and united the EU is, the differences in the style and dynamics of the democracies of various member states creates an enormous obstacle in establishing a united political policy. Moreover, due to the “legacy of mistrust” and “post-communist disappointment” most Post-Communist countries will be inherently wary of any strong movements for a united EU political identity as they will be reminiscent of the restrictive policies of communist ideology.

Howard & McFaul

Marc Howard argues in his article “The Weakness of Postcommunist Civil Society” that participation in civil society is very low in former Communist countries compared to older democracies and post-authoritarian regimes. He asserts that this is true for three reasons: the enduring legacy of mistrust of communist organizations because citizens were often forced to join state controlled groups, the persistence of close friendship networks in place of larger civil society organizations, and post-communist disappointment because of which citizens do not wish to participate more actively in civil society.

Even though civil society institutions have declined in the postcommunist era, Michael McFaul demonstrates in his article “Transitions from Postcommunism” that during the transition towards democracy there were many groups formed in order to unseat the incumbent regimes. Why would civil society be much stronger in the period of time before the transition than once democracy has already been established? Howard’s explanations do not fit to explain this phenomenon, because groups formed during this period even though there existed resentment and mistrust of communist organizations, and close friendship networks. The reason civil society was stronger before and during the transition towards democracy is that the citizens came together under the banner of a single cause in order to fight for that in which they believed.

McFaul outlines the factors that allowed groups to form, including a semi-autocratic regime, an unpopular current leader, and a united opposition. Because of the common objection to the incumbent leader, groups came together with that as a common interest. While Howard’s criteria serve to explain the current lack of participation in many social groups, etc., another reason that civil society, and in particular the participation in activist groups has declined, is because the citizens have already achieved some semblance of democracy. Although the degree to which these new governments can be considered truly democratic varies greatly, for the most part the political groups achieved their end, and the citizens now have much less of a reason to organize. This must be considered another important factor contributing to the decline of civil society in postcommunist societies.

Government is an Unlikely Agent of Change for Postcommunist Civil Society

After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism, many observers had high expectations for the future of postcommunist societies. Free from the restraints of totalitarianism, it was expected that the populations of these states would take advantage of their newfound ability to participate in government and voluntary civil society organizations. The reality of the postcommunist experience, however, has been quite different. Civil society in postcommunist states has been relatively weak, as measured by participation in voluntary organizations. In his article, The Weakness of Postcommunist Civil Society, Marc Morje Howards seeks to uncover an explanation for this deficit as well as recommendations for change in the future. While the article in general is valuable, Howard, in discussing the role of the state as an agent of change, presents a policy prescription for the future that is inconsistent with the explanations that he provides.

Howard discusses the legacy of the communist experience as one of the primary causes of the current civil society deficit in many postcommunist countries. Under communism, participation in civil organizations was neither independent of the state nor voluntary. Rather, citizens were obliged to join certain state-run civil and social organizations, largely so that the state could monitor and channel the activities of its citizens. For the most part, citizens disliked such forced participation in social organizations. Thus, they were more likely to form small social networks consisting of close friends and family. This legacy of the communist system has persisted into the postcommunist era, resulting in a deficit of civil society organizations. Citizens have embraced freedom as granting them the right to not participate in civil society, rather than the other way around.

Howard asserts that the civil society deficit can in part be corrected by an active role for the state in ‘facilitating the existence and flourishing of civil society organizations.’ This seems to be at odds, however, with the very cause of the civil society deficit, and would probably be more counterproductive than helpful. Under communism, the only civil society organizations were run by the state, and very unpopular. Given the persistence of the communist legacy, most citizens of postcommunist states would probably be wary of any attempts by their governments to create and encourage civil society organizations. They would be likely to equate these with the organizations that existed ender the communist state, and thus unlikely to participate.

If this is indeed the case, it seems to indicate that the outlook for postcommunist civil society is bleak, at least in the short term. As long as the majority of citizens, especially those in positions of power, have an outlook colored by the communist experience, civil society participation is likely to be low. Therefore, change is most likely to come as the result of generational change and the resultant shifts in attitude towards civil society participation.

The Delicacy of Civil Society

In Marc Howard's article, "The Weakness of Postcommunist Civil Society," Howard attempts to explain the relatively low levels of public participation in organizational activity in postcommunist countries according to three common factors. The third reason, being "postcommunist disappointment," is a weak argument that Howard seems to arrive at in a circular manner. Howard asserts that many postcommunist citizens have been dissatisfied by their new systems that have failed to fulfill their hopes and expectations for political and economic improvement. As a result, this disappointment has caused people to be less inclined to participate in public activities. Howard specifically refers to prodemocracy movements as an example of moving towards development in postcommunist countries. According to this argument, the weakness of civil society is a result of the failure to establish a democratic system and market causes people to be discouraged from organizational activity and therefore, produces a weak civil society. However, earlier in the article, Howard states that the weakness of civil society hinders the substantiation and consolidation of a democratic system. According to this claim, the failure of democracy occurs in the presence of an already weak civil society. In this light, the weakness of civil society that exists in postcommunist countries prevents the successful establishment of democracy. 

Howard's first reason, being "mistrust of communist organizations," is a stronger argument. Communist regimes did not allow organizational activity of the public and actually forced people to join state-controlled organizations, which instilled durable, negative feelings towards organizations in general. The people's communist experience may have had a strong effect and lasting impact even in a changed system. Howard suggests that the state may be valuable in encouraging postcommunist citizens to participate in public organizational activities. However, given the sense of mistrust of communist organizations that be applied similarly to public organizations, state action may be dangerous in regards to the people's perceptions and the potential for a slippery slope, and actually prevent increased participation. Postcommunist citizens must be convinced that their new systems will last, and are effective and real in order to strengthen civil society. Under these beliefs, the people will feel more comfortable and trustworthy of public activity. State initiative may make postcommunist citizens suspicious and lead to even more increased state action, which will hurt the growth of civil society.