Thursday, December 11, 2008

Shades of Red

The Chinese and Russian postcommunist experiences have been pursued on parallel yet divergent tracks. While the collapse of the Soviet Union ended the superficial existential tensions between communism and the West, the internal politics of China and Russia as well as their national psyche and identities have become areas of particular interest in each country's movements toward - and from – the West.

Ian Buruma juxtaposes the Chinese and Russian models of postcommunism through a prism of government involvement in civil society and the national economy. China’s approach is one of coordinated and centralized government actions in directing the path toward capitalism. To a certain extent the glasnost and perestroika political reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev and their role in the hemorrhaging of the central party’s influence and power over the state, have offered the Chinese a model to avoid. The Chinese leadership has fostered the opportunities of a massive influx of foreign direct investments and capitalized on economic reforms to offset political backwardness and injustice. Though Communism per se is no longer the stated archetype and structure of the Chinese state, the authoritarian regime now in place has come to dominate and influence every aspect of Chinese life. Buruma pays particular attention to the repression of academic dissidents and the inevitable corruption that occurs during the transition to capitalism.

Chinese officials have focused their technocracy on economic reform to foster a false sense of political progress. Aggressive development projects as well as foreign direct investment have fueled large-scale economic freedoms and a broader Chinese middle class. But as Buruma himself notes, “economic technocracy cannot by itself lend legitimacy to the government.” Despite China’s robust economic growth, a large portion of its population remains gripped by poverty. The Chinese postcommunist experience seems to have similar correlations with two Latin American models of nationalized (though somewhat capitalistic) economic planning and authoritarianism as the rule of law: Mexico and Chile, respectively. Mexico’s statist macroeconomic policy led to stifled expansion until recent liberalization allowed for robust growth. The ruthless Pinochet regime in Chile and the current leadership of China share similar human rights records.

While China has transitioned into a one-party, pseudo-capitalistic state, Russia remains a country of relative wealth mired in corruption and lawlessness. Democracy seems a bygone goal. President Putin’s efforts of limiting the free press and expanding central power by suppressing separatist movements resonate with the Chinese. Putinian nationalism appeals to Russian and Chinese alike. Despite its proximity to Europe and the West, Russia lags in political progress. In the end, both China and Russia seek controlled order in the economic and political spheres of their respective civil societies. Both countries are striving toward “efficiency,” but slowly degrading the quality of political culture while creating a false sense of progress with economic success.

Friday, December 5, 2008

More on the DR Congo

The Democratic Republic of the Congo certainly seems to be a popular topic for the blog this week, and rightly so. The DR Congo serves as a country containing numerous elements of civil war and violent conflict such as ethnic conflict, torture, economic issues, and human rights violations. It also provides some examples of the correctness and falsity of authors and concepts discussed this semester.

The DR Congo is marked by the long and arduous rule of dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. In power until the 1990s, he led with a iron fist and his time in power was filled with corruption and tremendous economic issues, as well as as allegations of torture and human rights violations. The recovery from his rule has taken twenty years and is still not nearly over. After Mobutu was toppled in 1997 and forced into exile, Laurent Kabila came into power, followed shortly by the nation's deadliest civil war. Finally, there were elections, but those involved violent clashes between opposition parties. An article by Bloomberg News claims that the winner of the most recent election, Joesph Kabila, Laurent's son, tortures people as though he was an authoritarian ruler.

In Thomas Carothers' article "The End of the Transition Paradigm," he discusses a number of assumptions about democratic transitions and then why they are not fully correct. The idea that "any country moving away from dictatorial rule can be considered a country in transition toward democracy," is false and misleading since countries can have features of democracy without the intention of being fully democratic. This is an error made often in articles, as it is in this one by Bloomberg News. Citing elections as an important step in the way to democracy, the article then goes on to describe many characteristics of the society that are not democratic at all. In fact, the central idea of the article is that the "democratically elected" leader is acting like an authoritarian dictator. Similarly, the thought that elections are central to the democratic transition is false because they do not necessarily indicate full participation and government accountability can remain weak.

According to Carothers, the DR Congo has not fully proven its intent to transition to democracy and, in many ways, is still stuck in the ways of the past. The DR Congo is a prominent example of the exhaustion of the transition paradigm and the need for a new way to understand transition.

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601116&sid=aZNJ2_SSM0cQ&refer=africa

Thursday, December 4, 2008

Real Questions

According to today’s New York Times’ article “Rwanda Stirs Deadly Brews of Trouble in Congo,” Rwanda’s government could be militarily backing the rebel group in Congo, led by Laurent Nkunda. Supposedly, the Tutsi-dominated government in Rwanda is ignoring country boundaries to aid fellow Tutsis in the rebel movement, financially and verbally motivating Rwandan soldiers to engage in combat.
As the article points out, the conflict highlights the tensions faced by political scientists to sort through the causes of intra-state conflict inflicted by rebellion movements and civil war. Rwanda is commonly associated with the concept of ethnicity. While, with in-depth analysis of Rwanda’s history, one can make a strong case for the socially-constructed nature of the main ethnic groups within the country, ethnicity has long been determined by commentators and politicians to be the driving factor of the Rwandan genocide. It is interesting, therefore, that the article mentions several references to the possible ethnic nature of Rwanda’s intervention in the Congo conflict. The journalist also presents the possibility that the aid is fueled by desires for natural resource control.
I think that the intrastate conflict within the Congo is enabled by a multiplicity of factors, and that it is impossible and perhaps unnecessary or even harmful to define one as the only or most important cause. Outside pressure from Rwanda, longstanding tensions between defined Tutsi and Hutu refugees and/or domestic populations, and natural resources all play a part and must be acknowledged for peace-making strategies. Ultimately, however, why are these tensions and identities specifically being called upon in determining the factors of rebellion? How are they being manipulated by those in control to sustain their power and intentions? These are the real questions that need to be pondered and, if possible, addressed.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/04/world/africa/04congo.html?_r=1&em

Is the Congo susceptible to falling back into civil war?

From August 1998 to July 2003 eight african nations and 25 armed groups participated in the Second Congo War, a civil war followed by the First Congo War only a year before. By 2008, the war and its aftermath claimed the lives of 5.4 million people, most of whom were civilians, making the Second Congo War the deadliest conflict worldwide since World War II. Although the war officially ended in 2003 with the signing of the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement, the fragility of the state has allowed continued violence and human rights abuses in the east. The driving force for much of the conflict derives from the ongoing ethnic conflict between Hutu- and Tutusi-aligned forces. 
An example of these ongoing conflicts can be seen in the efforts by the eastern Congo rebel leader Nkunda and his army. Clashing with local militias and forces of the Congolese government for several years, the activities of Nkunda in recent weeks have escalated. In just the last several weeks around 250,000 people have been displaced, bringing the total number of homeless people in the region to 1 million. Aside from the displacement of persons, there have been reports of massacres, rape, cholera, and wide-spread hunger. Hoping to protect his fellow Tutsi from the Hutu militias, Nkunda asserted in mid-November that he would march across Congo to the capital, Kinshasa, to overthrow the government of Joseph Kabila, who was elected two years ago.
But how likely is it that the Congo will slip back into civil war? Looking at the "strong correlations" that David Laitin and James Fearon established, the Congo still possesses many of the traits that could possibly lead to civil war, such as a low per capita income ($3,400 a year) and state weakness as a result of the Second Congo War. Although many believe that Nkuna's assertion to march across the capital is unlikely to be fulfilled because of the thick jungle the size of western Europe that he and his army would have to traverse, merely making such a statement spreads despair and adds to the dissatisfaction of the government by the voters. 
Hopefully with the proposed increase of 3,000 UN peacekeepers and the additional troops sent from neighboring countries such as Angola to train Congo's army will prevent further escalation of the fighting and come to the aid of the civilians.

Not All Indians Happy with the Tech Boom

Mehul Srivastava’s article “Bangalore Backlash” sheds light on the fact that even though the job boom in India’s technology industry has brought new prosperity and spending power to many newly-employed Indians, many Indians who have not seen their lives change significantly through globalization are not happy with the changes India’s culture is experiencing.
Srivastava uses the example of dance clubs and bars in Bangalore that are now required to adhere to a 1967 law that forces them to close by 11:30pm. The reinforcement of this law comes from pressure by older residents who are not happy with the disturbances the tech boom has created in its traditionally calm and peaceful city.
As Robyn Meredith pointed out in “The Elephant and the Dragon”, because the tech boom in India has brought higher paychecks to Indian workers, it has also brought the ability for these workers to spend their paychecks on goods such as cell-phones, cars, motorcycles and houses that they were not able to afford previous to the tech boom. The offshoring movement, as Meredith states, “has been a catalyst for economic growth in India” (88). Not only has it stimulated the tech industry, but also has created growth in restaurants and car and motorcycle factories as companies realize the extent of many Indians’ new spending power.
However, even with this economic growth, many Indians who were left out and did not prosper from the tech boom are unhappy with the culture shift that is taking place in India. Meredith points out this cultural shift, explaining, “millions of young, well-educated Indians live in a world different from that of their parents, who struggled to make ends meet on far lower salaries” (118). It is this class of Indians, the parents and siblings who were left out and still experience poverty, that is complaining. These Indians are angry that the Bangalore government is spending much more effort and money on accommodating the newly prosperous tech workers than its poorer citizens that actually need the help. The government has been building more roads in Bangalore, despite the fact that most of its inhabitants cannot even afford cars to drive on them, in order to get their tech workers to places faster. Many citizens cannot afford housing in Bangalore and thus must resort to living in slums, the very slums described in “The Elephant and the Dragon”, yet instead of building more affordable housing, the government has been constructing apartments that only the wealthy can afford.
The older, poorer citizens of Bangalore believe that the tech industry “commands a disproportionate amount of influence” on the government and is thus spurring government projects that help the rich rather than the poor. On the other hand, the tech industry believes that its influential effects on the government have spurred positive growth in the city and have created thousands of jobs. As Amartya Sen states in “The Elephant and the Dragon”, “whatever you can rightly say about India, the opposite is also true”(126). India is grappling with this state of transition, from the poor, older generation, to the new prosperous techies, and only time will tell how it manages its new prosperity.

for the article: http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_46/b4108053865815.htm

Putin and Authoritarianism in Russia

In his speech on Russia's transition to autocracy, Pierre Hassner says of Vladimir Putin, "For my part, I shall concentrate on the role of politics and especially of a single person—Vladimir Putin. Although he is neither the beginning nor the end of the story of democracy and capitalism in Russia, he does play a crucial role"(Hassner 7). For Hassner, Putin plays a crucial role, because of the immense power he has in Russian politics. Hassner points out that he has "led Russia into a harsh brand of authoritarianism with some fascist features," but "is full of contradictions and, while it has some extremely ominous aspects, he cannot be said to have burned all his bridges or to have made it impossible for Russia to evolve in a more positive direction once circumstances change" (Hassner 7). Essentially, Pierre Hassner is arguing that Putin, while having many times erred on the side of authoritarianism it does not mean that he has eliminated any hope for a prosperous and democratic Russia for, "we must not close our minds to the case made by his defenders, who stress his popular support among the Russian people" (Hassner 7). Putin does have popular support, even if his policies are seeming to become more an more authoritarian.

While Putin is no longer president, because that position is currently held by Dmitry Medvedev, he still exercises great influence over Russian politics. A recent BBC News article, "Putin Rules out early Kremlin bid", discusses the fact efforts have been made to increase a presidential term from four to six terms and that this has aroused speculation that Putin will run for president again soon. Putin himself told BBC, "The next presidential election will take place in 2012... For now, everyone must fulfill his duties in his place" (BBC News 12/4/2008). Essentially, Putin is saying that he is not going to make a decision until 2012. However, he did not rule out a potential election bid. If Putin were to run again and win he would not only be President again after a short interlude, but he would also hold the position for a six year term allowing him to be president for a total of fourteen years in his political career. This clearly lines up with the authoritarianism in Russia caused by Putin's immense power, which Hassner discusses. Putin also says that he has a "very effective tandem" (BBC News 12/4/2008) with Medvedev. This statement is important, because it brings up the question of whether it is necessary for Putin to run for president, because he may be satisfied with his influence over Medvedev and the power that he derives from his position of prime minister. Whether or not this is the case, the news that the article reports about Putin reveals the authoritarianism that Putin has created in Russia as he continues maintain a stranglehold on Russian politics.

Wednesday, December 3, 2008

Young Men

In their investigation into the different factors leading to civil war, Stanford University professors David Laitin and James Fearon establish some important correlations between social conditions and violence. In addition to poverty, geography, and “state weakness”, they stipulate that a country’s age distribution, in particular the abundance of young males from the age of 15-24, who “have physical and perhaps psychological characteristics that make them apt guerillas,” can tip an already unstable situation toward the brink of civil conflict. In “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War,” an article they published in 2003, they suggest that this could be a serious factor contributing to the abundance of recent civil conflicts in the Middle East and South Asia.

This realization could very well explain an October 2008 report by the Brookings Institute entitled “The Prospects of Youth Radicalization in Pakistan: Implications for US Policy,” which among other things recommends targeting socio-economic aid at Pakistani youth instead of focusing primarily on counter-terrorism. Although the Pakistani government certainly faces internal challenges, such as its inability or unwillingness to govern the tribal belts of the NWFP or controlling groups originally supported by the ISI like the Lashkar-e-Taiba, neighboring Afghanistan exhibits even greater symptoms of civil war with respect to the postulations of Laitin and Fearon (in addition to the conflict currently underway). With a per capita income of $1000, at least sixty percent of the population under 25, and a government currently under siege, (not to mention the centrality of the Hindu Kush to the country’s geography) the case of Afghanistan unfortunately strongly supports the Stanford professors’ correlations. These findings and other suggest that developing an institutional alternative to violence through educational reform and the promotion of sustainable economic growth appear to be the most important facets of any approach to quelling emerging civil conflicts in South Asia and the “developing” world more broadly.

Monday, December 1, 2008

Terrorism in Mumbai

The bombings last week in Mumbai, their ensuing terror, and the public outcry by the Indian population offer a 21st century example (or, perhaps, a better term would be a post 9/11 example) of the new face of ethnic violence. We have studied the way that the politics of identity can be subverted to disrupt or overthrow an existing nation-state - the documentary on the village in Bosnia is the archetype of how religious/ethnic diversity can be exploited to become so polarized that an absolute severance is the only acceptable solution. While we have also seen numerous political theorists who view ethnic diversity as a potential buttress to democratization, modernization, and development, the terror attacks in Mumbai demonstrate that the ethnic cleavages of today's world have taken on international/global dimensions that make it much more difficult to channel constructively.
The 100 million Muslims that live in India are a populous minority who live and work and vote in the world's largest democracy. The first global and Indian reactions to the bombings were an acknowledgment of the strength of the Indian Muslim community and an immediate - implicit - allegation that Indian's historical enemy, its neighbor Muslim Pakistan, was somehow involved. That the Indian Muslim population may be ethnically more bound to its Muslim Pakistanis is thus taken for a given. As opposed to the ethnic violence that spurred the Bosnian war and led to the breakup of Yugoslavia, this ethnic violence - assumingly Muslim against Hindu - implies other regional nation-states. How does a global political system try and deal with ethnic cleavages that threaten a state from both within and without?
One possible solution to this question would be Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilization," a reference made time and time again when considering CPS theory and current events. Should we forget framing the attacks in Mumbai in any terms of India/Pakistan/US and simply view it as just another example of a global ethnic war? Bush's "War on Terror" might very well support this. But, interestingly enough, admist the outcries of indignation and sorrowful recognition of tragedy, many American intellectuals have - for one of the first times since September 11 - spoken out in the name of a public hesitation. What is terror? Who are terrorists? Is this a jihadist attack against the west or an inner-state ethnic conflict? The only answer is that it's not clear. And without clarity, without being sure about the terms of political science we use to understand this event, we should be reluctant to apply the old paradigms of CPS to an event we can't quite yet understand.


Addendum:
Just came upon this article, it may shed some light to how this is actually being interpreted, correctly or not: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/02/world/asia/02mumbai.html?hp