Friday, October 31, 2008

EU Membership: Contradictory or Integral to the British Constitution?

The British constitutional system, or lack of a written constitution, seemingly represents a legacy of either trust or confidence of the British in their political system to the outside observer. In British Politics: A Very Short Introduction, Tony Wright coveys the transformational nature of the unwritten constitution by outlining its markers of change throughout the last century. Within the first half of the nineteenth century, he states that the dominant constitutional perception supported a democracy characterized by parliamentary legal sovereignty (Wright 23). Since, the United Kingdom has experienced transitions from a unitary state to devolution, a continual shift in power from the House of Lords to the House of Commons, and the effects of Blair’s constitutional revolution. To countries like the US, where the written Constitution supervises the practices of government, the assumingly fluid nature of the British constitution would merit concern for manipulation or corruption, especially in the face of change. But, as exemplified in the country’s acceptance of the constitutional norms of the first half of the century and the constitution’s potential to change with the ebbs of current events, British politics place a certain confidence in the transformational nature of its constitution, a nature that is weighted with tradition.
With such a confidence, it seems contradictory that the United Kingdom conceded to join the European Union in 1972, an institution with guidelines that could potentially undermine the authority of the British constitution. This is a contradiction still debated within today’s society. In Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945, Tony Judt states that the Prime Minister responsible for the United Kingdom’s participation was the “…only political leader since World War Two unambiguously and enthusiastically in favor of joining his nation’s fate to that of its continental neighbors” (Judt 526). Wright echoes this lack of country-wide sentiment, commenting that several citizens felt shortchanged and ignorant in the 1975 referendum (Wright 25). As the European Union has attempted to become even more closely unified, Britain has attempted to find its balance between receiving the benefits of the European Union while asserting a certain independence. Judt explains that their resistance to the common currency “…represented a device for blocking institutional integration” (Judt 716). Overall, in a continual attempt to define its identity, Britain has worked to reconcile its trust in its own independent political system that is continually shifting with other elements of identity, including class, race, and now a collective European identity (Wright 47). While the United Kingdom’s membership to the European Union might be interpreted as a challenge to its unique constitutional set-up, however, I agree with Wright’s claim that EU membership is not a challenge, but rather a part of the constitution, which is ultimately a narrative of the political shifts within the United Kingdom. Alongside the new issues facing nations today, the British constitution, anchored in tradition, will continue to document Britain’s interaction in the continually evolving history of man.

Thursday, October 30, 2008

British Politics: Recognizable yet on the Move…

Tony Wright’s overarching, thematic concept of the British political system as a system of governance that has, in the last half-century, been substantially transformed and continues to do so in the 21st century can be echoed in the acceptance speech of the current British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown. In 2007, Brown asserted, “I want a new constitutional settlement for Britain…devolution within a Union of nations: England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland – a Union that I believe in and will defend; local government strengthened with new powers – local communities empowered to hold those who make the decisions to account; and with community ownership of assets – greater power for more people to control their lives”1. Indeed, while we can still look at Britain as a nation that has retained some of its traditional idiosyncrasies, including having an organic, flexible constitution, a remarkably strong executive and a sense of tradition and continuity within the political system, it is important to recognize that the British system of government is indeed undergoing a series of transformations. In identifying and analyzing these changes and transformations, it is essential to point out what their implications are for the British political system.
Within British Politics, Tony Wright points out that Britain’s uniqueness stems from its distinctive geography, the absence of invasions since the 11th century Norman conquests and a lack of modern revolution, among other factors. In fact, while Britain certainly has an established system of governance, it lacks one uniform, codified document to which it can point as “the constitution” so that all of the documents that form its constitution are products of its history. However, having a strong, centralized and concentrated power of government and a single line of authority and accountability is not without its weaknesses. As Wright points out, the paradox of British politics is a strong governing capacity in combination with a weak administrative body. Thus, one might say that while the United States has a greater ineffectiveness in breaking down and moving past congressional deadlock, the political system of governance in Britain has its own source of ineffectiveness, namely, a weak system of mechanisms for translating policy into practice. Another interesting concept that Wright points out has to do with the way in which the British political system puts a primacy on governing. In other words, the British system of politics looks upon and understands the acquisition and exercise of power in a fundamentally different way than that of the United States, for a simple example. We think of power primarily in terms of limitation; the British think of power in terms of governing.
With the process of devolution in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, Tony Blair’s attempts to reform The House of Lords, and the argument for further integration of Britain into the European Union, the British system of government is certainly beginning to lose some of its idiosyncrasies. These changes present many implications. I will point out one of these as an example. In regards to the concept of responsible government, the traditional idea of ministerial accountability to Parliament no longer holds so that reforms of The House of Lords are likely to be followed by further reforms that may implement a more complex system of accountability checks on what can be seen as a rather lop-sided government. Certainly, it seems that Britain is treading a path of transformation, and it will be interesting to see what effects these reforms will have on the British system of politics as a whole.

1 http://www.epolitix.com/latestnews/article-detail/newsarticle/gordon-brown-leadership-acceptance-speech-in-full/

Britain's Balance of Power

Observers of British politics have often noted an apparent lack of balance of power in the British government, particularly when compared to the United States government’s independent judicial, executive, and legislative branches. Traditionally, however, Britain has had a balance of power, just a different one. It was a balance of Aristotle’s three benevolent forms of government: monarchy, aristocracy (House of Lords), and polity (House of Commons). More recently, however, some important balances exist below the superficial level of Members of Parliament and Ministers. The civil service is constant, persisting through various governments. The civil servants are the experts in their respective fields, be it agriculture, transportation, or foreign affairs. As a result, regardless of who is in power, the civil service acts as a common source of information to any government, checking the tendency of strong governments to make radical, polar policies when different governments are in power.

An important question arises from the contrast between Americans’ and Britons' approach to balance of power. America values limiting the federal governments’ ability to enact policies that are too extreme, whereas Britain values consistency in the people who inform policy makers. Which is better? I argue that it is better to have a government that a populace elects enact policies based on accurate information and well-thought out analysis of that information, because that would allow the government to be more representative of what the people want. On the other hand, the American system could encourage policies which are based on different information, depending on who is in power, because the people advising the president are his personal picks. These policies may be checked by legislative powers, but that is not the important matter. Would you rather have a balance of information or a balance of the ability to act on changing information?

Post-National Europe versus the rise of nationalism in the United States of America

Tony Judt provides an interesting and in-depth account of the post-national movement that swept over a Europe left dismantled in the wake of two world wars--wars that saw the rise of rulers blinded by nationalistic desires and were absent of an idea of an allegiance to a collective group of states titled Europe.  Rather, ruling parties and dictators sought to extend their power at the cost of other nations and the people of the continent--most notably a loss represented by the millions of human lives lost and widespread destruction of infrastructure.  Judt ingeniously and very early in the book asserts that "Europe's recovery was a 'miracle'.  'Post-national' Europe had learned the bitter lessons of recent history. An irenic, pacific continent had risen, 'Phoenix-like' from the ashes of its murderous--suicidal past".  He continues by stating that his account of post-war Europe is "a history of Europe's reduction" with states that "no longer aspire...to international or imperial status" and similarly Europe saw "the withering away of the 'master narratives' of european history".  In the end, "a modest substitute for the defunct ambitions of Europe's ideological past, there emerged belatedly...the 'European Model'. In what I found to be the most interesting chapters in the book, "Europe as a Way of Life", Judt provides an even deeper assessment of the birth of the "European Identity" from high culture to views on security issues.  I think that Milan captures the idea of the "European Identity" when he stated in his last post "..in order for Europe to survive it not only had to unite, but that each country within Europe had to develop a sense of allegiance to that state without losing its primary allegiance to Europe." The necessity of a collectivity for political, security, and economic survival gave birth to the creation of an even greater "European Identity"--an idea that is a continual project filled with the tension and balancing.

In order to further define the "European Identity", Judt relies heavily on differentiating Europe from the United States of America.  Comparing views on culture, political and military issues including the "tactless unilateralism" employed by the US, Judt reveals large differences between Europe and the United States.  While Europe sought to lift itself from the rubble and destruction left from the two world wars, the United States of America solidified its movement towards hegemony.  It is interesting to compare the post-national movement of Europe to what appears to be an indisputable rise of nationalism in America--a deep sense of patriotism that was reflected in its cultural identity and politics.  I have found the growing differences and approaches to security issues to be the most interesting topics of our day.  While Europe is a shining example of the effectiveness of soft power, America has adopted a nearly relentless unilateral strategy founded in blinded ideology.  

I am left questioning the result the Iraq War and the greater "War on Terror" will have on the United States as a whole.  Perhaps our current image after our rise to 'stardom' that gave way to uncompromising military actions, failed diplomacy, and a certain resentment for American culture will change greatly.  The evolution and devolution of the very distinct "American" and "European identity" are issues that are very pertinent to our day and topics I find truly fascinating.

British Politics

In his very short introduction to British politics, Tony Wright greatly emphasizes the strength of the British government. The British system of government has no separation of powers. The Prime Minister is elected by the parliament and due to the majority-rule system of British politics, the Prime Minister is always a member of the party who holds the majority in the parliament. Because there is no separation between the parliament and the executive and no judicial branch to determine the constitutionality of legislative material. The parliament and the Prime Minister are incredibly powerful, the Prime Minister and his party can do as they please. Essentially, as Tony Wright points out, there are no checks and balances as in most modern political systems.

However, what Tony Wright does not discuss in great detail is the existence of opposition political parties as a potential check on the ruling government. True, the opposition parties have little ability to thwart legislation proposed by the government. However, this is not important. It is the threat that the opposition party provides that can keep the ruling party in line. In British Politics, the opposition party has essentially a shadow government, whose purpose it is to study the actions of the ruling party, so that if they should win the next election they are prepared to govern immediately. There is always a chance that the general population could become dissatisfied and vote the new party into power. In theory, this threat should prevent the ruling party from moving to far in a certain direction. However, this theory has not been proven to work in practice. Tony Wright himself points out the three political revolutions in Britain after World War II. These revolutions were the Attlee revolution, the Thatcher revolution, and the Blair revolution. In each of these revolutions, the governing parties sought to undue or change much of what the previous parties had enacted. While political parties and election are clearly a weak check on the ruling party, they do serve to prevent the governing party from getting out of control. Maybe a a lack of strong checks and balances is the reason that the British government has remained stable for so long. Revolutions are able to occur in a civilized political realm rather than on the battle field.

Thursday, October 23, 2008

Was the Moral Price paid worth it?

Judt explains in his work, Postwar, that post-war stability in Europe was largely based on the horrific actions of Hitler and Stalin, as well as the population transfer and ethnic cleansing of minorities, brought about by Europeans during and directly after the war because the outcome of these actions was, as Judt puts it, a “tidier” and more homogenous Europe. Even though the moral price paid by Europeans, both in condemnable actions and then disregard of these actions, brought much needed stability to the continent, it is difficult to argue that it was the right thing for Europe to do and that it created a better Europe in the end. The most apparent negative outcome of the new, “tidier” Europe is the high levels of xenophobia that developed in post-war European countries and that persists to this day. For example, in France the third largest political party is the National Front, an extremist, right-wing party, whose motto is France for the French and whose platform vehemently opposes immigration. The creation of homogeneous European states essentially led to Europeans being more uncomfortable with a highly diverse Europe, when formerly, as Judt points out, Europe had been an “interwoven tapestry of overlapping languages, religions, communities and nations.”(8) Now, people can argue against this by pointing to the European Union as an example of acceptance and diversity in Europe. In response, I agree that the EU demonstrates, to a certain degree, a mixing of nationalities, but it is important to note that most of the countries in the EU still desire to maintain their national sovereignty and national identity. Europeans want to assert that they are not all alike and there is no single European identity, which is one of the impediments to the full consolidation of the EU. Additionally, Europeans are incredibly wary of admitting states to the EU that are dissimilar from member states, like Turkey, further demonstrating their discomfort with the presence of “others”, as Judt calls them.
Of course, there is essentially nothing Europeans could have done to stop Hitler and Stalin’s extermination, but the acts of ethnic cleansing and forced population transfers that took place after the war could have been avoided and stability still be ensured. Additionally, Europeans could have acknowledged the horrific crimes that Hitler committed against the Jews without threatening stability. Fortunately, Europeans eventually began to acknowledge their condemnable actions, but to think if things had occurred differently during and directly after the war, I am certain Europe would be a different place today, whether it would be better or worse I cannot say, but it is likely that they would be less fearful of diversity and more accepting of others because they would realize that it was intolerance and the non-acceptance of others as humans having worth that enabled the crimes against humanity to be committed during and after World War II.

Postwar, framework

Tony Judt introduces Postwar as a retelling of the period of European history after the end of WWII. He makes the claim that in 1989, he knew that how scholars perceived the preceding fifty years would now be drastically transformed, as old assumptions were “thrust” aside by the unceasing progression of history (2). He thus attempts throughout the piece to reorient conceived notions about the history of Europe following the end of the Second World War in light of the end of the Cold War with the fall of the Soviet Union. Though he claims this to be the fundamental premise of his analysis, the degree to which he still allows common historical trends and assumptions to color his account discredits this.
Specifically, his piece is tainted by its Western centrism and teleological framework. Granted it is a history of Europe; however, he brushes over worldwide forces that shaped the history of the latter half of the twentieth century—forces, such as the loss of global European influence and dominance that inevitably impacted the new European identity of which he writes. As such, he falls into the same pattern of Western centrism that has largely discredited other historical works.
Furthermore, he claims to disregard previous writings and histories of Europe as they were obscured by the policies of the Cold War; yet, in the next breath he establishes an entirely new, yet now, obviously fictitious endpoint. He simply attempts to establish historical trends that led to the European situation in 1989, as opposed to the European situation in 1988.
Finally, as has been discussed in other posts, Judt oversteps his historical bounds into the world of political theorization in making the claim that the nation-state should no longer be the primary unit of analysis, based on the rise of the European Union. However, in light of the weakened status of Europe and the rising dominance of other nations, it is illogical to rest one’s thesis with regards to global politics on one region.
Judt’s claims are thus questionable if not contradictory and in no way an attempt to truly rectify historical analysis of post-war Europe.