“Europe as a way of life”

Judt in his book “Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945” beautifully describes Europe’s struggle to recovery from the events of the beginning of the 20th century. Judt points out multiple ways that Europe began the road to stabilization. I think that his idea that Europe had to look to itself for the first time was very interesting. Throughout history Europe has been the hegemonic power in the international stage. It never really had to worry about its domestic issues, but more about states outside Europe. Judt points out that in order for Europe to recover after World War One and Two it had to join together and rebuild a foundation without its past. No longer did Europe have goals of conquering other nations or building stronger economies, but it had to work on rebuilding itself.

I thought it was important to recognize that in the past Europe was not always viewed as Europe, but rather as different state powers with different ideals and types of leadership. However after the wars, Europe had no option but to begin its model after the United States, literally a “united Europe”. I thought it was quite important how Judt pointed out that in order for Europe to survive it not only had to unite, but that each country within Europe had to develop of sense of allegiance to that state without losing its primary allegiance to Europe. This is very reminiscent of the U.S. Moreover, Judt points out that the only way of uniting and fixing Europe was to keep silent about much of its past. I think this is unfortunate but true in the sense that if European nations looked at how Germany killed their economies during World War Two, they would not have wanted to unite with Germany, therefore ruining the idea of “Europe as a way of life”.

From a Common Market to a Common Political Culture?

One of the most defining of the five main themes Tony Judt identifies in his introduction to Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 is that of the “European model”, which refers to the “distinctively ‘European’ way of regulating social intercourse and inter-state relations”. (7) Through their efforts to establish peaceful political relations on the continent, the conceptual founders of an integrated “European Union”, namely, Monet, Schumann, Adenauer, and De Gasperi, devised a mechanism for expanding economic inter-dependency between six Western European nations, the European Coal and Steel Community. (157-158) However, as Judt observes, the ECSC was “a political vehicle in economic disguise,” (158) and so the implication of this primarily economic union was the possibility of imposing constraints on political autonomy by placing limitations on sovereignty in the management of economies.

However, Judt clearly opposes the historical fallacy of a “post-national” Europe, (5) and it is thus no surprise to find the “supranational” orientation of European history continuously challenged. While the historic vision of the early theorists as well as the persistence of several successors, such as Helmut Schmitt, Valéry Giscard-D’Estaing, and Jacques Delors (excluding many others of course), has indisputably led to significant European integration, both political and economic, the tension inherent in the original formula, that which pits national sovereignty against peace and prosperity, continues to impede the efforts of the EU’s political elites to reform the federation’s increasingly outdated institutions.

Despite the current problem of legitimacy facing the EU (stemming from issues ranging from excessive enlargement to that of the “democratic deficit”), as well as that of forging a consensus on how to reform the Union, perhaps the mere condition of being forced to interact in an institutional framework has cleared the path for a common European political culture. In describing key aspects of democratic systems, Schmitter and Karl suggest, in “What Democracy is…and is Not”, that “they [contingent consent and bounded uncertainty] can emerge from the interaction between antagonistic and mutually suspicious actors and that the far more benevolent and ingrained norms of civic culture are better thought of as a product and not a producer of democracy.” (252 in O'Neil and Rogowski) Judt suggests that a similar transitional process has been underway in Europe when he asserts that “the European Community (later Union) did not lay the basis for an economically integrated Europe; rather, it represented an institutional expression of a process already under way. (326)

All of this seems to suggest that, although the European Union has encountered yet another political impasse in the forces opposed to the Lisbon Treaty, the institutional essence of the EU will not allow the present federation, now underpinned by a common currency and a host of normative standards in business and politics, to disintegrate significantly.

No "True," but Liberal and Lasting Democracy?

In the article, "What Democracy Is...And Is Not," Schmitter and Karl challenge the notion that democracy is a single type of regime that can be described by a list of definitive characteristics and institutions. As discussed in lecture, many Americans in particular have developed a tendency to idealize an image of "true" democracy. Schmitter and Karl assert that no such image exists in reality, but rather that there are various forms of democracy that depend on and differ according to socioeconomic conditions, state structures, and policies. In outlining the broad ideas that characterize democracies, Schmitter and Karl discuss the case of a fairly elected majority in which there is a concern that its decisions will threaten some minority. Schmitter and Karl believe that "successful democracies" employ certain mechanisms, such as a bill of rights, to secure minority rights. This idea contrasts with the distinction between liberal and illiberal democracies in Fareed Zakaria's article, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy." Zakaria states that liberal democracies have free and fair elections, as well as basic rights and freedoms for citizens. While Zakaria separates two broad types of democracy according to whether these basic rights and freedoms exist, Schmitter and Karl consider these same basic rights and freedoms to be a defining component of all democracies. They believe that a regime without this component is a failure of a democracy and therefore, is not a democracy. This is not necessarily true as seen by the existence of illiberal democracies in the world. 

Schmitter and Karl also discuss procedures that make democracy possible. Their two additions to Robert Dahl's list are that democracy prevails when (1) elected officials can act effectively and independently of opposition from unelected officials and (2) a system can operate autonomously within its borders, and without recognized approval of outside actors. These conditions are essential for sustaining democracy, but may be absent in a transitional democracy. Transitioning democracies generally endure a long and difficult process of change that can be relatively dramatic, depending on the nature of their original system. Whether or not a transitioning democracy will succeed in becoming a full and well-functioning democracy, of which there are various forms, depends on the establishment of the two procedures put forth by Schmitter and Karl. 

Democracy and America

What is democracy? The present energetic atmosphere of the presidential election in the United States provides a perfect representation of how democracy, as Americans know it, works. The Big Event of American politics, the presidential election is a symbol of what many Americans assume is the best way and believe is the only way to properly conduct government. However, as Schmitter and Karl point out in “What Democracy Is…And Is Not,” the American polity and democracy are not mutually exclusive; while American politics is democratics, the “American Way” is certainly not the only legitimate form of democracy undertaken by other states.

Schmitter and Karl are quick to argue that elections, though a distinctive part of the democratic process, are not as essential to a properly functioning democracy as one would think. While dismissing the idea of electoralism, Schmitter and Karl instead argue that civil society can be the most vital part to a developed, modern democracy. Adherence to interest associations can be seen even in the current Democrats vs. Republicans election. Instead of these interest groups working independently of these political parties, lobbyists and the like work within the plurality system and support the success of one party over another in order to further their own interests. According to Schmitter and Karl, then, the oft-feared behind-the-scenes maneuvering of interest groups is a sign of a healthy democracy in which citizens are expressing their preferences.

The authors, in the last section of their article, also argue against an assumption that many Americans believe to be true. The idea that democracies are automatically “the best” at everything they do, especially on the economic front, comes into question with the contemporary exponential economic growth of the still-authoritarian China. While Schmitter and Karl ultimately argue that democracies have a better chance for stability than authoritarian regimes, and while there is a healthy debate over China’s path towards democracy, it is especially necessary for Americans to realize, especially in such dire times, that merely being a democratic state does not guarantee future prosperity.

The Land of the Free...?

The United States of America is a democracy. This democracy, however, does not always equate to freedom. The definition of democracy provided by Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl in their article "What Democracy is.... and is not", is that democracy need not necessarily entitle complete freedom, as longs as its citizens have the freedom to choose representation. In America however, we consistently deem democracy as freedom - and push this ideal on other countries. But how free are Americans themselves? As we discussed in lecture, liberty in America is defined in negative terms - the freedom from certain factors. With freedom from we are in a way restricting our freedom to. Schmitter and Karl describe two forms of democracy - liberal and socialist. Roughly, the liberal form strives to place the fewest possible restrictions on a society, where as the socialist form aims to regulate society for the benefit of all. America's two major parties, Democrats and Republicans, tend to embody these two forms. As seen in the recent presidential debates, the Republican candidate John McCain strived to label democrats as socialist by restricting freedom and equalizing wealth. Yet both parties and the government itself, in fact restricts freedom - or diminishes positive liberty, in the sense that personal choice is restricted. Many of the choices of American citizens are restricted by government, choices that are not restricted by other "more socialist" democracies. Denmark, for example, has an extremely high level of government redistribution. Wealth is redistributed to the poor, education is available to all who desire it, and health care is provided for all citizens. These benefits are a consequence of restricting "freedom" in terms of a liberal democracy. Yet citizens of Denmark have more personal freedoms than many Americans, such as the freedom to attend a university - regardless of personal wealth. The question becomes; what freedoms are we restricting in America - for the sake of a liberal "free" democracy? 

Do We Really Want Democracy?

It has become common for people all around the world to speak of the term “democracy” as a glorious and highly sought after thing that will bring peace and freedom to everyone it encounters. America especially, has become increasingly adamant about the need to spread democracy abroad to everywhere that does not yet have it and has not been graced by its presence. Democracy is held in the highest esteem, and is generally believed to be the best and most ideal form of government for any and every country.
But are we right in jumping to the conclusion that democracy is right for everyone? Is it true that democracy is, in fact, the best form of government?
There is good reason to believe that we are not and that democracy may not be the best type of government for every country.
Democracy, like any other type of government, does not come without flaws. There has developed a tendency to pile up numerous expectations on the democratic form of government, many of which are not always met. Schmitter and Karl’s article “What Democracy Is…And Is Not” mentions these prospects for democracies that are not always fulfilled. These include the fact that democracies are not always more economically efficient than other forms of government. It is simply not feasible for people to expect new democracies to immediately be much more economically efficient than their previous form of government. Not only may democracies be less economically efficient, but also with regards to the administrative efficiency and implementation of policies. Democracies may very well prove to be slower and less efficient than other forms of government when making decisions, because more people must be included in decision-making, meaning more compromises must be made which may in turn lead to increased dissatisfaction with the outcome. In addition, democracies may not be more orderly or stable than the governments they take the place of because there will be more disagreement among officials.
Bearing these ideas in mind, should we still push for the democratization of countries who have not yet done so? Democracy is the messiest of all regimes and, since it may not bring a more effective or efficient government, may not improve the economy, and undoubtedly will not please everyone, is it really worth trying for every country?
Many people praise democracy for its ability to bring about peace and social justice and freedoms, but is it really democracy that does this?
People today bolster the idea of democracy in believing that a democratic system entails a protection of basic liberties, rule of law, separation of powers, etc. Yet just because these ideas are associated with democracy, does not mean that they are actually a part of what it means to be a democracy. In fact, as Fareed Zakaria argues, these freedoms are “theoretically different and historically distinct from democracy.” People need to stop making the mistake of believing that if a country becomes a democracy, all of its citizens will enjoy the social, political, economic and religious rights and freedoms that we associate with the United States government. Democracy itself is separate from constitutional liberalism. Because western governments have both democracy and constitutional liberalism in their systems, people incorrectly assume that the two automatically come as a pair, or that both are embodied in the term “democracy.” Democracy may not bring about constitutional liberalism, and while I applaud people for wanting those types of freedoms that come with constitutional liberalism, it is simply not correct and not realistic to think that they will appear in all countries that attempt to become democratic. People need to hesitate before jumping to the conclusion that democracy is the cure-all for any country with an unstable government, because it may not transform the country into the highly idealized form of government that people hope for it to be.

"Gray Zone" Democracies Are Not True Democracies

In Thomas Carothers’ article “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” he challenges the idea that many governments currently being labeled as transitioning to democracy are not really in transition, and instead are stuck somewhere in the “gray zone” between a dictatorship and democracy. He asserts that these governments are plagued by one of two perversions of democracy. “Feckless pluralism” in which democratic government is carried out, but the government is very corrupt and ineffective, and the society in general is not involved in the political process. The other gray zone perversion is a “dominant-power” democracy in which the government appears democratic but in reality is unfairly dominated by one ruling group.
Carothers’ argument can be substantiated by the definitions given in “What a Democracy Is… and Is Not” by Schmitter and Karl. They would agree that these gray zone “democracies” that are supposedly transitioning are not in fact democratic just because they hold elections and give the appearance of democracy, because these governments lack many of the elements that are central to the definition of democracy. These types of governments probably even seem stable, but Schmitter and Karl explicitly identify stability as a quality that is not necessary, and might even be unnatural, to a democratic system.
Although feckless pluralist systems “have significant amounts of political freedom, regular elections, and alternation of power between genuinely different political groupings,” the government itself is corrupt and does not have effective representatives (Carothers). The civil society is weak and therefore does not influence politics to provide interest aggregation and representation of the wills of the people. One of the characteristics that Schmitter and Karl assert is necessary to democracy is the ability for change to occur. Although in a feckless plurality groups switch in and out of power with frequency, they either block the other party from making change or they do not bring about true change at all.
If a feckless pluralist system is not a true democracy, then a dominant-power system definitely does not fall into this category either. Schmitter and Karl identify free and fair elections in which practically all are allowed to vote as a necessary characteristic of a democracy. In a power-dominant system, the elections are manipulated enough so that the dominant group may remain in power, which in turn makes change virtually impossible, violating another of Schmitter and Karl’s defining characteristics of democracy. Furthermore, by prohibiting other groups to come to power, they are not engaging in cooperation and accepting the true results of elections, which is a necessary component to the feasibility of a true democratic system.