EU Membership: Contradictory or Integral to the British Constitution?

The British constitutional system, or lack of a written constitution, seemingly represents a legacy of either trust or confidence of the British in their political system to the outside observer. In British Politics: A Very Short Introduction, Tony Wright coveys the transformational nature of the unwritten constitution by outlining its markers of change throughout the last century. Within the first half of the nineteenth century, he states that the dominant constitutional perception supported a democracy characterized by parliamentary legal sovereignty (Wright 23). Since, the United Kingdom has experienced transitions from a unitary state to devolution, a continual shift in power from the House of Lords to the House of Commons, and the effects of Blair’s constitutional revolution. To countries like the US, where the written Constitution supervises the practices of government, the assumingly fluid nature of the British constitution would merit concern for manipulation or corruption, especially in the face of change. But, as exemplified in the country’s acceptance of the constitutional norms of the first half of the century and the constitution’s potential to change with the ebbs of current events, British politics place a certain confidence in the transformational nature of its constitution, a nature that is weighted with tradition.
With such a confidence, it seems contradictory that the United Kingdom conceded to join the European Union in 1972, an institution with guidelines that could potentially undermine the authority of the British constitution. This is a contradiction still debated within today’s society. In Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945, Tony Judt states that the Prime Minister responsible for the United Kingdom’s participation was the “…only political leader since World War Two unambiguously and enthusiastically in favor of joining his nation’s fate to that of its continental neighbors” (Judt 526). Wright echoes this lack of country-wide sentiment, commenting that several citizens felt shortchanged and ignorant in the 1975 referendum (Wright 25). As the European Union has attempted to become even more closely unified, Britain has attempted to find its balance between receiving the benefits of the European Union while asserting a certain independence. Judt explains that their resistance to the common currency “…represented a device for blocking institutional integration” (Judt 716). Overall, in a continual attempt to define its identity, Britain has worked to reconcile its trust in its own independent political system that is continually shifting with other elements of identity, including class, race, and now a collective European identity (Wright 47). While the United Kingdom’s membership to the European Union might be interpreted as a challenge to its unique constitutional set-up, however, I agree with Wright’s claim that EU membership is not a challenge, but rather a part of the constitution, which is ultimately a narrative of the political shifts within the United Kingdom. Alongside the new issues facing nations today, the British constitution, anchored in tradition, will continue to document Britain’s interaction in the continually evolving history of man.

British Politics: Recognizable yet on the Move…

Tony Wright’s overarching, thematic concept of the British political system as a system of governance that has, in the last half-century, been substantially transformed and continues to do so in the 21st century can be echoed in the acceptance speech of the current British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown. In 2007, Brown asserted, “I want a new constitutional settlement for Britain…devolution within a Union of nations: England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland – a Union that I believe in and will defend; local government strengthened with new powers – local communities empowered to hold those who make the decisions to account; and with community ownership of assets – greater power for more people to control their lives”1. Indeed, while we can still look at Britain as a nation that has retained some of its traditional idiosyncrasies, including having an organic, flexible constitution, a remarkably strong executive and a sense of tradition and continuity within the political system, it is important to recognize that the British system of government is indeed undergoing a series of transformations. In identifying and analyzing these changes and transformations, it is essential to point out what their implications are for the British political system.
Within British Politics, Tony Wright points out that Britain’s uniqueness stems from its distinctive geography, the absence of invasions since the 11th century Norman conquests and a lack of modern revolution, among other factors. In fact, while Britain certainly has an established system of governance, it lacks one uniform, codified document to which it can point as “the constitution” so that all of the documents that form its constitution are products of its history. However, having a strong, centralized and concentrated power of government and a single line of authority and accountability is not without its weaknesses. As Wright points out, the paradox of British politics is a strong governing capacity in combination with a weak administrative body. Thus, one might say that while the United States has a greater ineffectiveness in breaking down and moving past congressional deadlock, the political system of governance in Britain has its own source of ineffectiveness, namely, a weak system of mechanisms for translating policy into practice. Another interesting concept that Wright points out has to do with the way in which the British political system puts a primacy on governing. In other words, the British system of politics looks upon and understands the acquisition and exercise of power in a fundamentally different way than that of the United States, for a simple example. We think of power primarily in terms of limitation; the British think of power in terms of governing.
With the process of devolution in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, Tony Blair’s attempts to reform The House of Lords, and the argument for further integration of Britain into the European Union, the British system of government is certainly beginning to lose some of its idiosyncrasies. These changes present many implications. I will point out one of these as an example. In regards to the concept of responsible government, the traditional idea of ministerial accountability to Parliament no longer holds so that reforms of The House of Lords are likely to be followed by further reforms that may implement a more complex system of accountability checks on what can be seen as a rather lop-sided government. Certainly, it seems that Britain is treading a path of transformation, and it will be interesting to see what effects these reforms will have on the British system of politics as a whole.

1 http://www.epolitix.com/latestnews/article-detail/newsarticle/gordon-brown-leadership-acceptance-speech-in-full/

Britain's Balance of Power

Observers of British politics have often noted an apparent lack of balance of power in the British government, particularly when compared to the United States government’s independent judicial, executive, and legislative branches. Traditionally, however, Britain has had a balance of power, just a different one. It was a balance of Aristotle’s three benevolent forms of government: monarchy, aristocracy (House of Lords), and polity (House of Commons). More recently, however, some important balances exist below the superficial level of Members of Parliament and Ministers. The civil service is constant, persisting through various governments. The civil servants are the experts in their respective fields, be it agriculture, transportation, or foreign affairs. As a result, regardless of who is in power, the civil service acts as a common source of information to any government, checking the tendency of strong governments to make radical, polar policies when different governments are in power.

An important question arises from the contrast between Americans’ and Britons' approach to balance of power. America values limiting the federal governments’ ability to enact policies that are too extreme, whereas Britain values consistency in the people who inform policy makers. Which is better? I argue that it is better to have a government that a populace elects enact policies based on accurate information and well-thought out analysis of that information, because that would allow the government to be more representative of what the people want. On the other hand, the American system could encourage policies which are based on different information, depending on who is in power, because the people advising the president are his personal picks. These policies may be checked by legislative powers, but that is not the important matter. Would you rather have a balance of information or a balance of the ability to act on changing information?

Post-National Europe versus the rise of nationalism in the United States of America

Tony Judt provides an interesting and in-depth account of the post-national movement that swept over a Europe left dismantled in the wake of two world wars--wars that saw the rise of rulers blinded by nationalistic desires and were absent of an idea of an allegiance to a collective group of states titled Europe.  Rather, ruling parties and dictators sought to extend their power at the cost of other nations and the people of the continent--most notably a loss represented by the millions of human lives lost and widespread destruction of infrastructure.  Judt ingeniously and very early in the book asserts that "Europe's recovery was a 'miracle'.  'Post-national' Europe had learned the bitter lessons of recent history. An irenic, pacific continent had risen, 'Phoenix-like' from the ashes of its murderous--suicidal past".  He continues by stating that his account of post-war Europe is "a history of Europe's reduction" with states that "no longer aspire...to international or imperial status" and similarly Europe saw "the withering away of the 'master narratives' of european history".  In the end, "a modest substitute for the defunct ambitions of Europe's ideological past, there emerged belatedly...the 'European Model'. In what I found to be the most interesting chapters in the book, "Europe as a Way of Life", Judt provides an even deeper assessment of the birth of the "European Identity" from high culture to views on security issues.  I think that Milan captures the idea of the "European Identity" when he stated in his last post "..in order for Europe to survive it not only had to unite, but that each country within Europe had to develop a sense of allegiance to that state without losing its primary allegiance to Europe." The necessity of a collectivity for political, security, and economic survival gave birth to the creation of an even greater "European Identity"--an idea that is a continual project filled with the tension and balancing.

In order to further define the "European Identity", Judt relies heavily on differentiating Europe from the United States of America.  Comparing views on culture, political and military issues including the "tactless unilateralism" employed by the US, Judt reveals large differences between Europe and the United States.  While Europe sought to lift itself from the rubble and destruction left from the two world wars, the United States of America solidified its movement towards hegemony.  It is interesting to compare the post-national movement of Europe to what appears to be an indisputable rise of nationalism in America--a deep sense of patriotism that was reflected in its cultural identity and politics.  I have found the growing differences and approaches to security issues to be the most interesting topics of our day.  While Europe is a shining example of the effectiveness of soft power, America has adopted a nearly relentless unilateral strategy founded in blinded ideology.  

I am left questioning the result the Iraq War and the greater "War on Terror" will have on the United States as a whole.  Perhaps our current image after our rise to 'stardom' that gave way to uncompromising military actions, failed diplomacy, and a certain resentment for American culture will change greatly.  The evolution and devolution of the very distinct "American" and "European identity" are issues that are very pertinent to our day and topics I find truly fascinating.

British Politics

In his very short introduction to British politics, Tony Wright greatly emphasizes the strength of the British government. The British system of government has no separation of powers. The Prime Minister is elected by the parliament and due to the majority-rule system of British politics, the Prime Minister is always a member of the party who holds the majority in the parliament. Because there is no separation between the parliament and the executive and no judicial branch to determine the constitutionality of legislative material. The parliament and the Prime Minister are incredibly powerful, the Prime Minister and his party can do as they please. Essentially, as Tony Wright points out, there are no checks and balances as in most modern political systems.

However, what Tony Wright does not discuss in great detail is the existence of opposition political parties as a potential check on the ruling government. True, the opposition parties have little ability to thwart legislation proposed by the government. However, this is not important. It is the threat that the opposition party provides that can keep the ruling party in line. In British Politics, the opposition party has essentially a shadow government, whose purpose it is to study the actions of the ruling party, so that if they should win the next election they are prepared to govern immediately. There is always a chance that the general population could become dissatisfied and vote the new party into power. In theory, this threat should prevent the ruling party from moving to far in a certain direction. However, this theory has not been proven to work in practice. Tony Wright himself points out the three political revolutions in Britain after World War II. These revolutions were the Attlee revolution, the Thatcher revolution, and the Blair revolution. In each of these revolutions, the governing parties sought to undue or change much of what the previous parties had enacted. While political parties and election are clearly a weak check on the ruling party, they do serve to prevent the governing party from getting out of control. Maybe a a lack of strong checks and balances is the reason that the British government has remained stable for so long. Revolutions are able to occur in a civilized political realm rather than on the battle field.

Was the Moral Price paid worth it?

Judt explains in his work, Postwar, that post-war stability in Europe was largely based on the horrific actions of Hitler and Stalin, as well as the population transfer and ethnic cleansing of minorities, brought about by Europeans during and directly after the war because the outcome of these actions was, as Judt puts it, a “tidier” and more homogenous Europe. Even though the moral price paid by Europeans, both in condemnable actions and then disregard of these actions, brought much needed stability to the continent, it is difficult to argue that it was the right thing for Europe to do and that it created a better Europe in the end. The most apparent negative outcome of the new, “tidier” Europe is the high levels of xenophobia that developed in post-war European countries and that persists to this day. For example, in France the third largest political party is the National Front, an extremist, right-wing party, whose motto is France for the French and whose platform vehemently opposes immigration. The creation of homogeneous European states essentially led to Europeans being more uncomfortable with a highly diverse Europe, when formerly, as Judt points out, Europe had been an “interwoven tapestry of overlapping languages, religions, communities and nations.”(8) Now, people can argue against this by pointing to the European Union as an example of acceptance and diversity in Europe. In response, I agree that the EU demonstrates, to a certain degree, a mixing of nationalities, but it is important to note that most of the countries in the EU still desire to maintain their national sovereignty and national identity. Europeans want to assert that they are not all alike and there is no single European identity, which is one of the impediments to the full consolidation of the EU. Additionally, Europeans are incredibly wary of admitting states to the EU that are dissimilar from member states, like Turkey, further demonstrating their discomfort with the presence of “others”, as Judt calls them.
Of course, there is essentially nothing Europeans could have done to stop Hitler and Stalin’s extermination, but the acts of ethnic cleansing and forced population transfers that took place after the war could have been avoided and stability still be ensured. Additionally, Europeans could have acknowledged the horrific crimes that Hitler committed against the Jews without threatening stability. Fortunately, Europeans eventually began to acknowledge their condemnable actions, but to think if things had occurred differently during and directly after the war, I am certain Europe would be a different place today, whether it would be better or worse I cannot say, but it is likely that they would be less fearful of diversity and more accepting of others because they would realize that it was intolerance and the non-acceptance of others as humans having worth that enabled the crimes against humanity to be committed during and after World War II.

Postwar, framework

Tony Judt introduces Postwar as a retelling of the period of European history after the end of WWII. He makes the claim that in 1989, he knew that how scholars perceived the preceding fifty years would now be drastically transformed, as old assumptions were “thrust” aside by the unceasing progression of history (2). He thus attempts throughout the piece to reorient conceived notions about the history of Europe following the end of the Second World War in light of the end of the Cold War with the fall of the Soviet Union. Though he claims this to be the fundamental premise of his analysis, the degree to which he still allows common historical trends and assumptions to color his account discredits this.
Specifically, his piece is tainted by its Western centrism and teleological framework. Granted it is a history of Europe; however, he brushes over worldwide forces that shaped the history of the latter half of the twentieth century—forces, such as the loss of global European influence and dominance that inevitably impacted the new European identity of which he writes. As such, he falls into the same pattern of Western centrism that has largely discredited other historical works.
Furthermore, he claims to disregard previous writings and histories of Europe as they were obscured by the policies of the Cold War; yet, in the next breath he establishes an entirely new, yet now, obviously fictitious endpoint. He simply attempts to establish historical trends that led to the European situation in 1989, as opposed to the European situation in 1988.
Finally, as has been discussed in other posts, Judt oversteps his historical bounds into the world of political theorization in making the claim that the nation-state should no longer be the primary unit of analysis, based on the rise of the European Union. However, in light of the weakened status of Europe and the rising dominance of other nations, it is illogical to rest one’s thesis with regards to global politics on one region.
Judt’s claims are thus questionable if not contradictory and in no way an attempt to truly rectify historical analysis of post-war Europe.

Postwar

In his book "Postwar", Tony Judt makes a compelling argument for the rebirth of Europe not as a reaction to the coming Cold War, but rather as an essential development borne of economic, political, and yes, military necessity.  Previous to World War II, there was little unity among European states; rather, they in face competed for hegemony over the region.  What remained after WWII was a group of individual states that all had been decimated in the war.  These states recognized the necessity of banding together to help rebuild, to prevent the utter destruction that took place during the war from happening again.  It is only after WWII that the world began to recognize Europe as a unique entity, not just a group of competing states.

In a sense it seems somewhat similar to the United States after gaining its independence.  What remained was a ragtag collection of states that had suffered serious losses during the revolution and in addition held individual interests.  This loose confederation was soon proven to be a failure, and a more direct political unity was required.  Judt argues that a similar transformation took place in Europe.  While the European Union wasn't formed until 1993, other organizations began to form shortly after the war, such as NATO, which provided the greater political, economic and military unity that was required in the postwar time period.  While certainly one couldn't say that all European states agree on every issue (just look at the attempt to pass an EU constitution), there is a great deal more unity than in the pre-WWII era.  Should Europe (or for that matter, the United States) have chosen to continue as a group of competing states, it seems quite likely that it would have failed to achieve the political clout and economic power that it holds today.  Instead, Europe made the wise choice of uniting and in doing so has become one of the most powerful players in international politics today.

European Integration - a new unit of political study

In his Postwar, Tony Judt describes the creation and stabilization of the European Union as the evolution from a “customs union – a ‘common market’ – bound together by not much more than a common external tariff” to something that resembles “many of the external trappings of a conventional government” (723). The development of the European Union in its current form is, in broad terms, parallel to the history of Europe from its moral and economic desolation following the end of WWII to today’s increasingly unified continent. Although it is historical in its original aim, Judt’s book thus forces an alternative, broader thesis onto its reader: a questioning of the continued relevance of using the nation-state as the fundamental unit of comparative political study, not to mention as the cornerstone of the grand master narrative that we use to organize modern political history.

Indeed, the first move toward a European Union began in the mid-1950s, with the formation of the European Steel and Coal Community. That this was seen as largely a way to avoid future conflict and integrate Germany into Europe speaks volumes about the way that economic mechanisms are intertwined with politics itself. The evolution of the European Union, as a successor to the European Economic Community, was itself just an outgrowth on the theme of integration. The fall of the Soviet Union and the need to rehabilitate ex-Soviet satellite states into the European community was a powerful and difficult issue, but its resolution into the 25 state European Union has proved to one of the most essential defining characteristics of the 21st century. Today, the European Union faces new crises, chief among them is how to expand or conserve the traditional definition of what it means to be a European – thus, we see an ongoing, and, some would say, irresolvable, issue of potential membership for Turkey in the EU. Furthermore, the home of the EU – Belgium – is undergoing its own European

All of this is instrumentally fundamental to our study of comparative politics. If we look at Europe as the birthplace and chief exporter of the modern nation-state, and if we see the state as the primary unit of measurement in sizing up the world, the integration of the various states of Europe into a single, cohesive unit poses new questions about ethnic, political, and social organization. These issues can be seen as just a by-product of the greater trends of globalization. But in the European sense, the European Union offers a new face of political life. We have studied extensively the different way states can look based on their economic and political makeup. In the case of the EU, we have a multitude of different types of people coming together to form something, which, although not a state, is stable and united.

Judt says that the European Union now is “coming to resemble Switzerland” (735). Despite the failure to ratify the Constitution of the EU, we can that this description says a lot about what has happened in Europe over the past 60 years. How have so many different states, with different political histories, different languages, different cultures, managed to come together like this? We have studied extensively the way in which different communities find their role in a state – think of the special status, and continuing conflict, of the province of Quebec for instance. The European community has somehow managed to emphasize its similarities and common goals over its differences. Underwriting all of this is something that Judt calls “the European way of life” – arguably analogous to Huntington’s description of a civilization. Whether such commitment to peace and stability can continue throughout the challenges of the 21st century – an influx of non-European immigrants, the question of Turkey, the lack of political constitution – is, of course, not certain. But the creation and success of the European federation thus far adds a whole new element to study of comparative politics.

“Europe as a way of life”

Judt in his book “Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945” beautifully describes Europe’s struggle to recovery from the events of the beginning of the 20th century. Judt points out multiple ways that Europe began the road to stabilization. I think that his idea that Europe had to look to itself for the first time was very interesting. Throughout history Europe has been the hegemonic power in the international stage. It never really had to worry about its domestic issues, but more about states outside Europe. Judt points out that in order for Europe to recover after World War One and Two it had to join together and rebuild a foundation without its past. No longer did Europe have goals of conquering other nations or building stronger economies, but it had to work on rebuilding itself.

I thought it was important to recognize that in the past Europe was not always viewed as Europe, but rather as different state powers with different ideals and types of leadership. However after the wars, Europe had no option but to begin its model after the United States, literally a “united Europe”. I thought it was quite important how Judt pointed out that in order for Europe to survive it not only had to unite, but that each country within Europe had to develop of sense of allegiance to that state without losing its primary allegiance to Europe. This is very reminiscent of the U.S. Moreover, Judt points out that the only way of uniting and fixing Europe was to keep silent about much of its past. I think this is unfortunate but true in the sense that if European nations looked at how Germany killed their economies during World War Two, they would not have wanted to unite with Germany, therefore ruining the idea of “Europe as a way of life”.

From a Common Market to a Common Political Culture?

One of the most defining of the five main themes Tony Judt identifies in his introduction to Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 is that of the “European model”, which refers to the “distinctively ‘European’ way of regulating social intercourse and inter-state relations”. (7) Through their efforts to establish peaceful political relations on the continent, the conceptual founders of an integrated “European Union”, namely, Monet, Schumann, Adenauer, and De Gasperi, devised a mechanism for expanding economic inter-dependency between six Western European nations, the European Coal and Steel Community. (157-158) However, as Judt observes, the ECSC was “a political vehicle in economic disguise,” (158) and so the implication of this primarily economic union was the possibility of imposing constraints on political autonomy by placing limitations on sovereignty in the management of economies.

However, Judt clearly opposes the historical fallacy of a “post-national” Europe, (5) and it is thus no surprise to find the “supranational” orientation of European history continuously challenged. While the historic vision of the early theorists as well as the persistence of several successors, such as Helmut Schmitt, Valéry Giscard-D’Estaing, and Jacques Delors (excluding many others of course), has indisputably led to significant European integration, both political and economic, the tension inherent in the original formula, that which pits national sovereignty against peace and prosperity, continues to impede the efforts of the EU’s political elites to reform the federation’s increasingly outdated institutions.

Despite the current problem of legitimacy facing the EU (stemming from issues ranging from excessive enlargement to that of the “democratic deficit”), as well as that of forging a consensus on how to reform the Union, perhaps the mere condition of being forced to interact in an institutional framework has cleared the path for a common European political culture. In describing key aspects of democratic systems, Schmitter and Karl suggest, in “What Democracy is…and is Not”, that “they [contingent consent and bounded uncertainty] can emerge from the interaction between antagonistic and mutually suspicious actors and that the far more benevolent and ingrained norms of civic culture are better thought of as a product and not a producer of democracy.” (252 in O'Neil and Rogowski) Judt suggests that a similar transitional process has been underway in Europe when he asserts that “the European Community (later Union) did not lay the basis for an economically integrated Europe; rather, it represented an institutional expression of a process already under way. (326)

All of this seems to suggest that, although the European Union has encountered yet another political impasse in the forces opposed to the Lisbon Treaty, the institutional essence of the EU will not allow the present federation, now underpinned by a common currency and a host of normative standards in business and politics, to disintegrate significantly.

No "True," but Liberal and Lasting Democracy?

In the article, "What Democracy Is...And Is Not," Schmitter and Karl challenge the notion that democracy is a single type of regime that can be described by a list of definitive characteristics and institutions. As discussed in lecture, many Americans in particular have developed a tendency to idealize an image of "true" democracy. Schmitter and Karl assert that no such image exists in reality, but rather that there are various forms of democracy that depend on and differ according to socioeconomic conditions, state structures, and policies. In outlining the broad ideas that characterize democracies, Schmitter and Karl discuss the case of a fairly elected majority in which there is a concern that its decisions will threaten some minority. Schmitter and Karl believe that "successful democracies" employ certain mechanisms, such as a bill of rights, to secure minority rights. This idea contrasts with the distinction between liberal and illiberal democracies in Fareed Zakaria's article, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy." Zakaria states that liberal democracies have free and fair elections, as well as basic rights and freedoms for citizens. While Zakaria separates two broad types of democracy according to whether these basic rights and freedoms exist, Schmitter and Karl consider these same basic rights and freedoms to be a defining component of all democracies. They believe that a regime without this component is a failure of a democracy and therefore, is not a democracy. This is not necessarily true as seen by the existence of illiberal democracies in the world. 

Schmitter and Karl also discuss procedures that make democracy possible. Their two additions to Robert Dahl's list are that democracy prevails when (1) elected officials can act effectively and independently of opposition from unelected officials and (2) a system can operate autonomously within its borders, and without recognized approval of outside actors. These conditions are essential for sustaining democracy, but may be absent in a transitional democracy. Transitioning democracies generally endure a long and difficult process of change that can be relatively dramatic, depending on the nature of their original system. Whether or not a transitioning democracy will succeed in becoming a full and well-functioning democracy, of which there are various forms, depends on the establishment of the two procedures put forth by Schmitter and Karl. 

Democracy and America

What is democracy? The present energetic atmosphere of the presidential election in the United States provides a perfect representation of how democracy, as Americans know it, works. The Big Event of American politics, the presidential election is a symbol of what many Americans assume is the best way and believe is the only way to properly conduct government. However, as Schmitter and Karl point out in “What Democracy Is…And Is Not,” the American polity and democracy are not mutually exclusive; while American politics is democratics, the “American Way” is certainly not the only legitimate form of democracy undertaken by other states.

Schmitter and Karl are quick to argue that elections, though a distinctive part of the democratic process, are not as essential to a properly functioning democracy as one would think. While dismissing the idea of electoralism, Schmitter and Karl instead argue that civil society can be the most vital part to a developed, modern democracy. Adherence to interest associations can be seen even in the current Democrats vs. Republicans election. Instead of these interest groups working independently of these political parties, lobbyists and the like work within the plurality system and support the success of one party over another in order to further their own interests. According to Schmitter and Karl, then, the oft-feared behind-the-scenes maneuvering of interest groups is a sign of a healthy democracy in which citizens are expressing their preferences.

The authors, in the last section of their article, also argue against an assumption that many Americans believe to be true. The idea that democracies are automatically “the best” at everything they do, especially on the economic front, comes into question with the contemporary exponential economic growth of the still-authoritarian China. While Schmitter and Karl ultimately argue that democracies have a better chance for stability than authoritarian regimes, and while there is a healthy debate over China’s path towards democracy, it is especially necessary for Americans to realize, especially in such dire times, that merely being a democratic state does not guarantee future prosperity.

The Land of the Free...?

The United States of America is a democracy. This democracy, however, does not always equate to freedom. The definition of democracy provided by Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl in their article "What Democracy is.... and is not", is that democracy need not necessarily entitle complete freedom, as longs as its citizens have the freedom to choose representation. In America however, we consistently deem democracy as freedom - and push this ideal on other countries. But how free are Americans themselves? As we discussed in lecture, liberty in America is defined in negative terms - the freedom from certain factors. With freedom from we are in a way restricting our freedom to. Schmitter and Karl describe two forms of democracy - liberal and socialist. Roughly, the liberal form strives to place the fewest possible restrictions on a society, where as the socialist form aims to regulate society for the benefit of all. America's two major parties, Democrats and Republicans, tend to embody these two forms. As seen in the recent presidential debates, the Republican candidate John McCain strived to label democrats as socialist by restricting freedom and equalizing wealth. Yet both parties and the government itself, in fact restricts freedom - or diminishes positive liberty, in the sense that personal choice is restricted. Many of the choices of American citizens are restricted by government, choices that are not restricted by other "more socialist" democracies. Denmark, for example, has an extremely high level of government redistribution. Wealth is redistributed to the poor, education is available to all who desire it, and health care is provided for all citizens. These benefits are a consequence of restricting "freedom" in terms of a liberal democracy. Yet citizens of Denmark have more personal freedoms than many Americans, such as the freedom to attend a university - regardless of personal wealth. The question becomes; what freedoms are we restricting in America - for the sake of a liberal "free" democracy? 

Do We Really Want Democracy?

It has become common for people all around the world to speak of the term “democracy” as a glorious and highly sought after thing that will bring peace and freedom to everyone it encounters. America especially, has become increasingly adamant about the need to spread democracy abroad to everywhere that does not yet have it and has not been graced by its presence. Democracy is held in the highest esteem, and is generally believed to be the best and most ideal form of government for any and every country.
But are we right in jumping to the conclusion that democracy is right for everyone? Is it true that democracy is, in fact, the best form of government?
There is good reason to believe that we are not and that democracy may not be the best type of government for every country.
Democracy, like any other type of government, does not come without flaws. There has developed a tendency to pile up numerous expectations on the democratic form of government, many of which are not always met. Schmitter and Karl’s article “What Democracy Is…And Is Not” mentions these prospects for democracies that are not always fulfilled. These include the fact that democracies are not always more economically efficient than other forms of government. It is simply not feasible for people to expect new democracies to immediately be much more economically efficient than their previous form of government. Not only may democracies be less economically efficient, but also with regards to the administrative efficiency and implementation of policies. Democracies may very well prove to be slower and less efficient than other forms of government when making decisions, because more people must be included in decision-making, meaning more compromises must be made which may in turn lead to increased dissatisfaction with the outcome. In addition, democracies may not be more orderly or stable than the governments they take the place of because there will be more disagreement among officials.
Bearing these ideas in mind, should we still push for the democratization of countries who have not yet done so? Democracy is the messiest of all regimes and, since it may not bring a more effective or efficient government, may not improve the economy, and undoubtedly will not please everyone, is it really worth trying for every country?
Many people praise democracy for its ability to bring about peace and social justice and freedoms, but is it really democracy that does this?
People today bolster the idea of democracy in believing that a democratic system entails a protection of basic liberties, rule of law, separation of powers, etc. Yet just because these ideas are associated with democracy, does not mean that they are actually a part of what it means to be a democracy. In fact, as Fareed Zakaria argues, these freedoms are “theoretically different and historically distinct from democracy.” People need to stop making the mistake of believing that if a country becomes a democracy, all of its citizens will enjoy the social, political, economic and religious rights and freedoms that we associate with the United States government. Democracy itself is separate from constitutional liberalism. Because western governments have both democracy and constitutional liberalism in their systems, people incorrectly assume that the two automatically come as a pair, or that both are embodied in the term “democracy.” Democracy may not bring about constitutional liberalism, and while I applaud people for wanting those types of freedoms that come with constitutional liberalism, it is simply not correct and not realistic to think that they will appear in all countries that attempt to become democratic. People need to hesitate before jumping to the conclusion that democracy is the cure-all for any country with an unstable government, because it may not transform the country into the highly idealized form of government that people hope for it to be.

"Gray Zone" Democracies Are Not True Democracies

In Thomas Carothers’ article “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” he challenges the idea that many governments currently being labeled as transitioning to democracy are not really in transition, and instead are stuck somewhere in the “gray zone” between a dictatorship and democracy. He asserts that these governments are plagued by one of two perversions of democracy. “Feckless pluralism” in which democratic government is carried out, but the government is very corrupt and ineffective, and the society in general is not involved in the political process. The other gray zone perversion is a “dominant-power” democracy in which the government appears democratic but in reality is unfairly dominated by one ruling group.
Carothers’ argument can be substantiated by the definitions given in “What a Democracy Is… and Is Not” by Schmitter and Karl. They would agree that these gray zone “democracies” that are supposedly transitioning are not in fact democratic just because they hold elections and give the appearance of democracy, because these governments lack many of the elements that are central to the definition of democracy. These types of governments probably even seem stable, but Schmitter and Karl explicitly identify stability as a quality that is not necessary, and might even be unnatural, to a democratic system.
Although feckless pluralist systems “have significant amounts of political freedom, regular elections, and alternation of power between genuinely different political groupings,” the government itself is corrupt and does not have effective representatives (Carothers). The civil society is weak and therefore does not influence politics to provide interest aggregation and representation of the wills of the people. One of the characteristics that Schmitter and Karl assert is necessary to democracy is the ability for change to occur. Although in a feckless plurality groups switch in and out of power with frequency, they either block the other party from making change or they do not bring about true change at all.
If a feckless pluralist system is not a true democracy, then a dominant-power system definitely does not fall into this category either. Schmitter and Karl identify free and fair elections in which practically all are allowed to vote as a necessary characteristic of a democracy. In a power-dominant system, the elections are manipulated enough so that the dominant group may remain in power, which in turn makes change virtually impossible, violating another of Schmitter and Karl’s defining characteristics of democracy. Furthermore, by prohibiting other groups to come to power, they are not engaging in cooperation and accepting the true results of elections, which is a necessary component to the feasibility of a true democratic system.