Rosenfeld's What Democracy?

In response to both Rosenfeld’s What Democracy?, a piece aimed at demonstrating the necessity of abolishing the US Senate, and my colleagues responses to this same piece, I would have to say that I too am in disagreement with Rosenfeld that democracy in the United States would be better served by the abolition of the Senate.
However, I would like to first address an issue raised in the responses of others to this piece. One of the main arguments against Rosenfeld’s assertion is that the Senate serves an important purpose in that is ensures the representation of the interests of each state in the federal government; the general idea is that, were representation in the federal government to be solely proportional, the specific interests important to smaller states would get lost in the “majority will.” I take issue with this argument because it assumes that states have separate, distinct interests. However, I would contend that it is not the state, an entity which can be as varied in geography and peoples as the country itself, but rather other groups, such as farmers, industrialists, etc that have differing interests; we assume these interests fall along state lines, but in truth, they very often do not. As such, would it not be more effective to give a specific set of interest groups, entities that actually represent real issues, representation in Congress as opposed to these artificially constructed, perhaps archaic cartographic divisions?
Still the fact remains that I disagree with Rosenfeld that the US Senate should be abolished. He does an exceptional job in pointing out the “undemocratic” elements, or flaws with the institution, but fails to recognize the necessary purposes it serves. He doesn’t touch on the division of responsibility, or the fundamental tenet of checking the excesses of other governmental bodies. Furthermore, he criticizes the inefficiency of a bicameral legislature, a quality that in actuality is beneficial in ensuring the weighty nature of the law-making process. His argument is incomplete, in that is fails to address these and other fundamental issues in this centuries-old debate.

Mobility: When Should Citizens React?

Hardin’s outline of the Tragedy of the Commons raises an important, somewhat separate issue from his main topic: the means of mobility. Under what conditions will people promote change? Rosenfeld also hints at this question. He alludes to great political and cultural shifts in America’s past, including the termination of slavery and numerous amendments that have directly challenged the structure of our original government. In their articles, both authors demand extreme changes on two topics they deem crucial for the continuity and advancement of society. Hardin argues that the world must “mutually coerce” individuals into adopting a temperance of population growth contribution, while Rosenfeld states that the Senate must be done away with so that US resources can be better utilized. Both authors have points that are both compelling and controversial. Their declarations challenge morality and status quo assumptions. But beyond determining the actual validity of their theses, their arguments nudge at a deeper issue: what determines the turning point when humans accept and even promote change and choose to disregard the assumed truths by which they have been living? What would cause individuals to embrace the radical changes demanded by Hardin and Rosenfeld?
Hardin argues that the tragedy of the commons impedes the “invisible hand,” or the process by which individual choices eventually bring about the best situation for the majority, from functioning properly in commons issues like population. He then, however, proposes that societies might attempt to address the issue through “mutual coercion,” where societies collectively agree to limit themselves to ultimately enhance their freedom. But this poses a very interesting problem. How are such coercive acts mutually agreed upon if no one wants to limit their personal liberties? At what point does the common good overshadow personal rights? Who actually determines the greater good, and what causes widespread mobility within a group of people? Rosenfeld presents a gripping argument emphasizing the possible existence of an envelope of stagnation and power corruption within the United States’ government. But what would cause us, as his readers, to choose action over ignorance and actually demand change?
While Hardin’s paper was written in 1968, we can see the cycle of common goods abuse transformed to widespread counteraction in today’s environmental struggle against issues like global warming and alternative fuel. The process has made a definitive leap in the last decades, moving the global conscience of environmental problems from recognition, marginalization and contestation, acceptance as truth, to some forms of mobilized action. Ultimately, it is up to the public to examine such cycles in our past, recognizing parallels between truth and acceptance. In this way, we can know when mobilization is a necessary step.

Rosenfeld's What Democracy?

The United States Senate does not need to be abolished. Richard Rosenfeld’s article, What Democracy: The Case for Abolishing the U.S. Senate, tries and fails to make the argument that the U.S. Senate needs to be done away with and is undemocratic. Not only is the U.S. Senate an imperative part to the U.S. Government but also plays a significant part in U.S. lawmaking. Proportionality is not Democracy. Just because the Senate is not evenly represented across the United States according to population, does not mean it isn’t a part of democracy. Not only does the Senate act as a check to the House and the President, but moreover gives equal representation to states with regards to unique environmental causes, land issues and agricultural sectors.

It is commonly known that states with large urban cities have larger populations such as New York or California. These cities are very important to the United States, but are not the whole. Even though Nevada doesn’t have as large as a population as New York, doesn’t mean it should have less Senators than other states. The proportionality aspect is already covered with the distribution of members of the House. The Senators can evenly represent the 50 states on others issues such as the environment. Many less populated states have large land reserves and have grand environmental issues, such as Alaska. Is it fair to say that the polar bears in Alaska should get less representation than the pigeons in New York? What about the oil reserves? Rosenfeld would say yes. Rosenfeld believes that we should abolish the Senate and therefore due away with our check and balance system. I would like to ask Rosenfeld, what would happen if a leader took over the House corruptly by bribing the members? What would happen to the U.S.? This can happen. This is happening in other parts of the world that claim themselves as democracies. A majority of the people are unhappy, but because they don’t have a check and balance system they can’t do much about it. They just have to sit tight and wait for some country like the U.S., to intervene. 

The American Approach to Philanthropy

The United States began as a country dedicated to small government. Its first governing document, the Articles of Confederation, attempted to avoid the formation of a powerful, repressive government. Although that document was subsequently replaced by the United States Constitution in 1789, the tracks of British rule remained, engrained in the American mind.

In addition, Americans had a particularly individualistic approach toward life, stressing self-reliance. The very idea of westward expansion by many pioneers was about moving away from a larger social group, in the individual spirit of adventure or financial enterprise.

Through the years, these underlying American differences from Europeans have been manifested by a relative paucity of social finance measures. Currently, there are many people that criticize Americans for their selfishness and lack of philanthropy. Whereas the authors of “Why Doesn’t the United States Have a European-Style Welfare State?” suggest the discrepancy derives from the American beliefs that redistribution favors minorities and that if someone is poor it is his or her own fault, I argue that critics ignore a the fundamental mentality of Americans.

True, the United States government spends less on welfare programs than most European countries. But that is not because they see the poor as lower for a reason. Rather, increased taxation leads to greater inefficiency in the economic system. With a subsequently lower GDP, there would be less to spend on welfare regardless. Moreover, Americans have always been skeptical of government intervention, especially economic intervention, because of the individualistic and capitalistic foundation of many individuals. But that does not mean they are unwilling to giver their own personal money. The article mentions that Americans give more money per capita than any of the other countries in the survey. People in the United States would rather feel charitable than feel like their money is being taken for shady purposes.

In summary, the American way creates greater financial efficiency, which generates a higher GDP. People have more money to spend, and will contribute more of it if they get to chose where it goes. Americans are no less charitable than Europeans. They just like to bypass the bureaucracy.

Collier and Marx - same idea?

Two of our readings this week concerned themselves with the discussion of divisions in our civil societies. Paul Collier explored the way in which ethnicity divides us and Marx and Engels, in the “Manifesto of the Communist Party,” investigate class and economic separations. However, both writings end up at similar conclusions.

Marx and Engels write that the bourgeois have exploited the proletariat who does the labor for them; however, this has put the bourgeois in a dangerous position because they have essentially created a revolutionary class.

Collier demonstrates that a number of common perceptions about ethnic diversity are false. Ethnically diverse communities are not necessarily less cooperative and more war prone, nor do they generally have worse economic performance.

The way in which Collier analyzes issues of ethnic diversity is through economics, and examining the economic performance of diverse states versus homogenous ones. As an example of recent ethnic conflicts, Collier uses post-Cold War secessions, many of which have been violent. These recent examples, he argues, are the result of economic causes more often than ethnic causes. Is it not extremely telling that most of his explanations on the reasons for conflict and his conclusions on their causes are economic? Marx and Engels determined that money was the central troubling factor in their society, and it seems that Collier has concluded the same. Even with problems of ethnic diversity, the overarching problem is money. Perhaps these scholars from two different times are telling us the same thing: money is the key factor in conflict. Is it not frightening that a human creation may be the root of all our problems (excluding for the time being the argument that race is also a human creation – one cannot deny that there is an obvious physical difference that humans have put a name and stigma to)?

"A Clash of Civlizations" in the context of Post-Cold War and Pre 9/11 Thought

Despite how often it is assigned, discussed and debated, I often feel as though Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” is constantly being misinterpreted because it is not placed in the context of the time it was written. The most common criticism I hear of Huntington is that his ideas seem to be too general and too obvious, while at the time they were a distinctly divergent from the typical theories of international politics.

“Clash of Civilizations” was written the summer of 1993 when international relations theory was desperately seeking new ideas and new theories to explain not only the end of the Cold War, but to characterize the next era of politics. Most had no answers as the existence of the United States as the hegemon and the sole superpower was unthinkable under previous preconceptions. Huntington stood apart from the mainstream by declaring the end of the “Western civil wars.” He describes all previous major intercountry conflicts as only between Western powers, be it competing monarchs (pre nation state conflicts) or competing ideologies (The World Wars, The Cold War). Huntington asserts that the new era of international relations will be characterized by a clash of civilizations not ideologies or economic conflicts.

Many focus on how Huntington chooses to identify or describe civilizations, by generalizing culture groups but his conception of civilizations can be flexible and does not invalidate his theory. The critical point to Huntington’s argument is not merely that there will be a clash of civilizations, but specifically that the “clash” will be between a Western and non-western civilization. This was divergent from most IR theory because most political scientists (even those studying Comparative Politics, as noted in last week’s Macridis readings) focused on Western powers and possible western conflicts.

While conventional opinion now is that the next great intercountry conflict will be between a Western power and a non-western power, at the time of writing, Huntington’s contention was unprecedented. Furthermore, his ideas gained popularity and made their way into mainstream thought after 9/11, an event that no pre-2001 IR theories had a sufficient explanation for. However, under Huntington’s framework, a tragic event on the scale of 9/11 is no surprise and merely the beginning. Consequently, even if Huntington’s assertions seem self explanatory or self evident now, it is merely because it is viewed in contrast with current thought, not as a time capsule of insight.

A Marxist Solution?

According to Marx, ideologies are “the outgrowth of the conditions of your bourgeois production and bourgeois property.” He argues that social and class identities such as ones family, ethnicity, and religion are ideological identities created by the exploiting bourgeois class in order to sustain the current system of exploitation, while the real defining element of society is the social rank. In considering solutions to the problem of ethnic diversity and rebellion within Collier’s essay, I find that a Marxist solution, although it seems to divert some of the causes for war, would not only fail to eliminate rebellion and ethnic civil war, but that it would practically increase the likelihood of dominant and minority relationships within a state.

Collier explains that ethnic civil war occurs when there is one dominant ethnic group and one minority ethnic group, and that finance is often a motivating factor for war instead of merely an enabling factor. To dissolve the possibility of ethnic conflict, Marx would simply eliminate the financial aspect of war by socializing the means of production within a communist society. Such a solution would stop rebel leaders whose underlying motivations are “the capture of primary commodity rents,” since they could no longer reap the benefits of their exploitation. Furthermore, by eliminating class, a Marxist system would theoretically create one identity, letting the ideological ethnic loyalties vanish with the bourgeois. Thus, Marx has eliminated the dominant-minority relationship that increases the risk of civil war and ethnic conflict. In practice however, I don’t believe this would succeed.

The competing force within the elimination of class and other social structure is the loss of a strong and personal sense of identity. Collier states, “People identify more strongly with their kin group, ethnic group, or religious group, than with the nation”(83). This is because national identities must be largely imagined, where as kin identities are experienced. The loss of kin and ethnic identity could actually facilitate the creation of a minority ethnic-like identity within the state, which would create the dominant-minority relationship present in Collier’s evidence for civil war. Whereas the pre-communist state may have been fractionalized ethnically (low risk of conflict according to Collier), communism would unsuccessfully attempt to create one universal identity. Naturally, a rebel group would develop creating the dominant-minority relationship that is so detrimental to peace.

Marx' 08--"The German Ideology" today

As I read Marx's "The German Ideology" I cannot help but think that the effects of globalization have rendered much of his predictions of a "world-history" as invalid.  Marx predicts that as the world becomes interconnected through the "intercourse" of nations--specifically through trade--history would shift from a nationally biased, categorized, and manipulated history into a "world history."  It is my belief that the obstacles to a truly world-history absent of manipulation and biases  are even more extreme in our modern world of categorization.

While many would argue that the effects of globalization have caused our ever increasing interconnected world to be brought together, I argue that increased interaction has actually highlighted our differences, reinforcing our ideas of categorization and ethnocentrism.  At the onset of "The German Ideology" Marx asserts that it has not occurred to any previous German philosopher to look into "the relation of their criticism to their own material surroundings."  In the world we live in today, one constantly thinks of schools of thought, nationalities, political views, and religious views that might contribute to a certain way of thinking.  If anything, the inter-connectedness of our world has fueled the movement of thinking in terms of concepts, abstracts, religion, and politics, which is not the proper empirical method in Marx's view of thinking in terms of material and "intercourse".  When we listen to a commentator on tv, we think to ourselves "That is a very Republican way of thinking" or "Of course the French would say that" or we assert that a person comes to a conclusion because of a certain religious or ideological thinking.  One of Marx's main objections stems from the idea of placing groups of people into "a mere category"; however, Globalization has brought forth a differentiation among people from different nations, creeds, language groups and ideologies rather than bringing us together.

Further, Marx envisions that "if in England a machine is invented, which deprives countless workers of bread in India and China, and overturns the whole form of existence of these empires, this invention becomes a world-historical fact." He objects to current documentation, or in his view manipulation, of history as he feels that "They forget all other nations, all real events, and the theatrum mundi is confined to Leipzig book fair and the mutual quarrels of criticism".  Thus, one can understand that Marx's belief is that the mere interaction between states will act as a catalyst for the end of nationally influenced history and foster a movement towards an over-arching "world history".  It is obvious that this is not the case in our world today, as one event is depicted in thousands of different ways.  For every group of people who see a person as a terrorist, there is undoubtedly a group who sees the person as a hero.  My main problem in trying to apply Marx's assumptions to reality is that it is impossible to get beyond our world of politics, ideology and religion--a goal of Marx.  

If anything "history is made the goal of earlier history....history receives its own special aims" is even more true today.  National leaders and heads of trans-state terrorist networks look at an event from a certain ideological, religious, or political perspective and use it for a certain aim.  Thus, I argue that the inter-connectedness of the world has brought forth an even further manipulation of history fueled by evident differences in belief systems.  

Yes, we as a global community are more aware of world events, but the categorization and portrayal of these events is different from one state to the next, one religious center to the next, and one cultural group to the next.

Marx and Huntington: Overgeneralizations

Huntington’s “The Clash of Civilizations?” and Marx and Engels’s Manifesto of the Communist Party are probably two of the most commonly assigned readings for courses on international relations. Interestingly, they are both commonly seen as “wrong”. I argue that the reason for this interpretation is both authors’ overgeneralizations in their attempts at creating broad theories on the future of human interaction.

In “The Clash”, Huntington sees civilizations as the broadest form of association of human beings and in his analysis, the only one that will truly matter in the future of international relations. Although he seems to have prophesized such conflicts as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the issue of radical Islam, and the events in Darfur, his conclusion that all these major disputes will occur upon civilization lines is absurd. People have an extensive set of social ties. They share families, nations, religions, and bowling leagues. To neglect all of these and say that all major conflict, is to ignore the various levels of conflict throughout history. Moreover, Huntington’s logic fails. If the size of the group with which people primarily associate themselves has increased throughout history, why would it stop at civilization? Why couldn’t there be a human affiliation in the future that prevents all conflict from ever happening?

Marx, on the other hand, generalizes too far in that direction. People lose all sub-human level associations. Everyone is of the same class, families are abolished, and society will be conflict-free, Marx argues. As does Huntington, Marx rejects not only the significance of the variety of social ties, but also the importance of individualism. Individualism brings both good and bad. Most of the great improvements in technology and quality of life have come from individual endeavors. Conversely, individuals can make the decision to engage others in conflict or to avoid it.

Although both theories provide correct insights in parts, the complexity of human social ties is the reason these two views are commonly criticized as “wrong”.

The Spirit v. The Dogma of Capitalism

In examining "the Spirit of Captialism," Weber seeks to bolster his theory on the Protestant work ethic by describing and explaining the evolution of the capitalistic mentality - and, in particular, the American Puritan.  Benjamin Franklin and his edicts of "time as money" serve as an ideal archetype for the preaching of what is "not simply a means of making one's way in the world, but a peculiar ethic." And, as Weber reminds us, it's not a coincidence that Franklin is also called "the first American." Franklin and his ethos (think Poor Richard's Almanack) represent a way of conceptualizing the world that seems both natural and wise to us.

But, Weber  - and, to some extent, much of the field of comparative politics - says that the spirit of capitalism is certainly not natural (meaning universal of independent of human action) and may not even be wise. In light of the trend to make "democracy" and "free market capitalism" synonymous, this revelation should make us reconsider to what degree the spirit of capitalism has pervaded the American political culture. 

Indeed, what is so uniquely American about Benjamin Franklin's maxims can be summed up by Weber's description of the takeover of capitalism: "The ability to free oneself from the common tradition, a sort of liberal enlightenment, seems likely to be the most suitable basis for a business man's success."  Here we see the application of a strain of rationalism that puts self-fulfillment and self-expression as the bedrock of the capitalistic mentality.  But, as Weber warns in his later chapters," such intense belief in rationalization leads to the "iron-cage" - a loss of freedom in the face of enormous bureaucracy, an alienation from the community, and ultimately, the end of the bowling leagues that indicate so what exactly civic society entails. What Weber means then when he reminds us that "rationalism is an historical concept which covers a whole world of different things," is that is not a given that the particular spirt of capitalism that defines American political culture today must dominate forever or dominate everywhere. 

Violence or Rational Choice?

Weber argues that obedience is compelled by fear. A state compels obedience by monopolizing the use of legitimate violence. I once thought that this assertion did not apply to certain states and forms of government like the United States. I argued that individuals most likely obeyed because they observed the laws as consistent with rational choice, and thus there was little need for the the government to hold coercive violence. However, in observing my own choices, I believe that the use of legitimate violence is still the foundation for a cohesive state.

If there were no speed limits, would I slow down merely because it is the rational choice? No. Although I understand that speeding increases my chance of death in an accident, I choose to speed because I do not always make the logical choice. On the road, I drive fast because I believe that a quick arrival to my destination is more important than my safety or the safety of others. However, when I separate myself from my specific circumstances, I can consent to the rationality of speed limits. Nonetheless, my will is weak, and I will likely speed again. Thus, I consent to giving legitimate use of violence (or in this case, speeding tickets) to the state so that fear of punishment will compel my obedience.

Professional Politicians and the Limits of the Modern State

Weber’s definition of the modern state, “a compulsory association which organizes domination”, indicates that he uses a functional approach in describing this political entity. However, his essay not only addresses the attributes of the state, which he discusses thoroughly in comparing the different structures of bureaucracies that have evolved over time, but also the functionaries of the state, which emerge as “professional politicians”. Like the “free demagogue” and the city state, Weber claims that these politicians, who incidentally sound very capitalistic, originated solely in the Occident. His estimation that it is often such politically conscious members of civil society who ascend to positions of leadership to form a “plutocratic” ruling establishment remains pertinent to our study of political systems today, especially those that resemble the more entrepreneurial type (such as the UK or the US, where politicians often have other occupations prior to entering politics).

Regardless of whether the state in question resembles this bureaucratic web of entrepreneurs or else a specific political class who have managed to monopolize the “legitimate use of violence”, the state no longer seems to have the exclusive political capacities attributed to it by Weber. While we could turn to various communities of the developing world to substantiate the emergence of anarchic political relations, we could also refer to our own political culture. In a country where “a well regulated militia” and the right for citizens to “bear arms” is considered essential to safeguarding freedom, one might amend Weber’s definition slightly. Perhaps it is not a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence that is specific to every state, but a monopoly on sanctioning legitimate political relations between citizens, which could include delegating the right to use violence.

Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation"

In max Weber’s “Politics as a Vocation,” “the state is a relationship of men dominating men, a relation supported by means of legitimate (i.e. considered to be legitimate) violence”(2). He describes three legitimations of such domination: “traditional,” “Charismatic,” and “Virtue of Legality”(2). Weber states that these three forms only provide “legitimations”, whereas in reality obedience is compelled by motives of fear of punishment from the authority and hope for reward. Certainly fear is dominant in a “traditional” Hobbsian state; individuals are compelled to obey for fear of their lives. Weber argues that hope is most dominant for the cohesion of a Charismatic society; he describes a pyramid of power, where individuals obey in order to preserve the advantages of their social and political positions. However, in an Institutional State (from King’s lectures of the 3 Theories of a state, Sept 3) legitimized in a rational and legal manner, the power of fear is less apparent, and possibly less coercive than in any other theory of political authority. When a state institutionalizes previously known rational principles, they essentially “channel human behavior”(Sept 8) in right and orderly ways. Over time, Institutions conform rational behavior into social norms so that fear and hope play lesser roles in determining obedience. In forms of “charismatic” legitimacy, the power-holder maintained his followers with the hope of spoils—“that is, the exploitation of the dominated through the monopolization of office”(3). However rational Institutionalism completes “the separation of the administrative staff…from the material means of administrative organization”(4), and the hope of spoils is reduced to rational anonymous rules to which everyone can logically consent. A legal form of legitimacy results in most of society accepting that the governing rules are rational. Thus it is easy to internalize these rules as ways of living a good life; it is easy to associate these rules with morality. Thus, with widespread consent, obedience comes not from fear, but it becomes a habituated way of life.

What/who is a state?

What/who is a state? For Weber, it is "a human community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (1). Even though Weber defines the state in terms of a community, this collectivity is difficult to comprehend in our political reading and discussion. In lecture Professor King defines a state as "a political-administrative and legal entity exercising sovereignty over a defined territory inhabited by a population" (Sept. 3). I believe that the state is even more than an entity or a perceived existence; rather it is a personified being. In other words the language used when describing the state is the same language one might use to describe a person. For Weber, the state can be successful at things or the state can take things. In lecture, the state can believe, it can tell, and it even can love ("the state loves to put people into categories") (Sept. 10). The language we use implies a state that has desires, beliefs, abilities, and failures. In reality, like Weber says, the state is a community of multiple individual human beings. But the members of a nation ruled by a state speak and refer to it as if it is a single person and a unified authority. The state, unlike politics, is not something we participate in, but rather something we obey. This may be a construction of the general population as a way to simplify and understand the complexities found in a pluralistic ruling entity. Or perhaps it is propelled by the individual members of the state itself, as a tool to promote a unified support and trust in "its"/"their" legitimacy.